Marriage, Tort, and Private Ordering: Rhetoric and Reality in LGBT Rights by Culhane, John G.
Chicago-Kent Law Review
Volume 84
Issue 2 Symposium: The Evolution of Academic
Discourse on Sexual Orientation and the Law: A
Festschrift in Honor of Jeffrey Sherman
Article 4
April 2009
Marriage, Tort, and Private Ordering: Rhetoric and
Reality in LGBT Rights
John G. Culhane
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.kentlaw.iit.edu/cklawreview
Part of the Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Scholarly Commons @ IIT Chicago-Kent College of Law. It has been accepted for inclusion
in Chicago-Kent Law Review by an authorized editor of Scholarly Commons @ IIT Chicago-Kent College of Law. For more information, please
contact dginsberg@kentlaw.iit.edu.
Recommended Citation
John G. Culhane, Marriage, Tort, and Private Ordering: Rhetoric and Reality in LGBT Rights, 84 Chi.-Kent L. Rev. 437 (2009).
Available at: https://scholarship.kentlaw.iit.edu/cklawreview/vol84/iss2/4
MARRIAGE, TORT, AND PRIVATE ORDERING: RHETORIC AND
REALITY IN LGBT RIGHTS
JOHN G. CULHANE*
I. INTRODUCTION
Phyllis Lyon and the late Del Martin lived through a dramatic arc of
LGBT progress. Together for more than fifty years, they began as passion-
ate activists whose lives together defied law and social norms.1 While their
own advocacy and that of countless others over a decades-long struggle
resulted in decriminalization of sexual intimacy in same-sex relationships
and even a measure of (often grudging) social acceptance, they long re-
mained outsiders to the panoply of rights and protections the law reserved
for opposite-sex couples, especially married ones. Matters improved for
some with the advent of domestic partnership laws conferring some of the
benefits typically associated with marriage, 2 but whether that final marker
of social approbation will be achieved remains unclear.
Featured in a moving photograph widely circulated over the Internet
in 2004, Lyon and Martin were among the temporarily joyful couples
granted marriage licenses in San Francisco. As is well-known, the Califor-
nia Supreme Court ruled that San Francisco mayor Gavin Newsom had
overstepped his authority in issuing such licenses to same-sex couples, and
the unions were stricken from the record.3 Two efforts by the California
legislature to remedy the problem were vetoed by Governor Schwarzeneg-
ger,4 but the California Supreme Court held that excluding same-sex cou-
* Professor of Law and Director, Health Law Institute, Widener University School of Law;
Lecturer, Yale University School of Public Health. Professor Culhane blogs about law and many other
topics at wordinedgewise.org. The author would like to thank Chris Feigenbutz for able research
assistance, Christopher Leslie for inviting me to participate in this important symposium, and the staff
of the Chicago-Kent Law Review (especially Mathew Dudek) for all of their hard work.
1. Lisa Leff, Lesbian Del Martin Dies at 87, MERCURY NEWS, Aug. 27, 2008,
http://www.mercurynews.com/breakingnews/ci-l0316518?nclick_check-l.
2. For a good summary of the evolution of California's domestic partnership laws, see National
Center for Lesbian Rights, The Evolution of California's Domestic Partnership Law: A Timeline,
http://www.nelrights.org/site/DocServer/timeline-ab205_042307.pdf? doclD = 1265.
3. Lockyer v. City and County of San Francisco, 95 P.3d 459, 494-95 (Cal. 2004).
4. Lynda Gledhill, Schwarzenegger Vetoes Gay Marriage Bill as Promised, SFGATE, Sept. 29,
2005, http://www.sfgate.com/cgi-bin/article.cgi?f-=/c/a/2005/09/29/MNG41EVVEG5.DTL; Jill Tucker,
Schwarzenegger Vetoes Same-Sex Marriage Bill Again, SFGATE, Oct. 13, 2007, http://www.sfgate.com
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pies from marriage violated the state's constitution5 and thereby allowed
the resilient couple to (re)marry on June 16, 2008-the first and only cou-
ple granted that right in San Francisco on the first day the court's order
went into effect.6
Home to almost one in eight Americans, 7 California's progressive
move could portend a seismic shift in the marriage equality struggle, but
the signs are mixed. The vast majority of other states explicitly ban same-
sex marriages, many through recently enacted amendments to their state
constitutions. 8 Even in California, only Martin's recent passing might have
been able to prevent the state from snatching away their long-sought recog-
nition yet again; on November 4, 2008, the California voters attempted to
amend the state's constitution to limit marriage to the union of a man and a
woman, thereby overriding the court's ruling. 9 The legal struggle for equal-
ity is not nearly over, and the social meaning of gay marriages-and of gay
lives more generally-promises to be bitterly contested for the foreseeable
future. While much of the attention has focused on marriage, other legal
and social issues continue to play out.
As one example of such a contested issue, consider whether Del Mar-
tin could have recovered in tort law for an injury suffered by Phyllis Lyon.
/cgi-bin/ article.cgi?f=/c/a/2007/10/13/BAT7SPC72.DTL,
5. In re Marriage Cases, 183 P.3d 384, 453 (Cal. 2008).
6. Janet Kornblum, Gay Couples Tie the Knot in Calif., USA TODAY, June 17, 2008,
http://www.usatoday.com/printedition/news/20080617/a__gaymarriagel 7.art.htm.
7. See THE WILLIAMS INSTITUTE, CENSUS SNAPSHOT, CALIFORNIA LESBIAN, GAY, AND
BISEXUAL POPULATION (2008), available at http://www.law.ucla.edu/williamsinstitute/publications/
CA%20Snapshot%202008.pdf.
8. As of May 2008, forty-one states have banned same-sex marriage by statute. As of that same
date, twenty-seven states had defined marriage in their constitutions. That number potentially increased
by three after November, 2008, as Arizona, California and Florida all passed constitutional amend-
ments. See National Conference of State Legislatures, Same Sex Marriage, Civil Unions and Domestic
Partnerships, http://www.ncsl.org/programs/cyf/samesex.htm#DOMA (last visited Apr. 5, 2009). As
discussed in note 9, infra, the constitutionality of California's amendment was in doubt as of this writ-
ing.
9. Jesse McKinley & Laurie Goodstein, Bans in 3 States on Gay Marriage, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 6,
2008, at Al. Whether the ban will endure, and whether it will affect those who were married during the
period between the court's ruling and November 4, are two questions that are open as of this writing.
On November 5, several gay rights organizations and the ACLU, along with several private law firms,
filed suit seeking relief against Proposition 8. The central argument in their brief is that the voters
attempted to achieve a "revision" of the state constitution rather than an "amendment"; such revisions
require prior legislative approval by a supermajority. See Lambda Legal, Proposition 8 Challenged,
http://www.lambdalegal.org/publications/articles/proposition-8-challenged.html (last visited Nov. 7,
2008). The site also contains a link to the statement from California Attorney General Jerry Brown
expressing his view that the marriages already performed are legal. Brown has also asked the Supreme
Court to decide the constitutionality of the amendment. Jesse McKinley, California Asks Court to
Weigh Marriage Ban, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 18, 2008, at A13. On March 5, 2009, the California Supreme
Court heard oral argument on whether Proposition 8 was a valid use of the state's initiative process. I
live-blogged the argument. Three Acts on Prop 8: 11, http://wordinedgewise.org/?p=40 (March 5, 2009).
Under California law, a decision must be handed down within ninety days of argument.
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Until recently, the answer would have been no because of the judicial insis-
tence that the only relationships that count are those already cemented by
law (like marriage) or by blood. A support agreement between the two, by
contrast, might well have been enforced.
With occasional emphasis on developments in California, this Article
examines the recent history of these sometimes parallel tracks of the legal
recognition of gay and lesbian relationships: the move towards marriage;
the redress of injuries to same-sex relationships through tort law; and judi-
cial recognition of support agreements between same-sex partners. I argue
that the socially enforced invisibility of gay lives and relationships had a
lexical correlate: the phrase "gay marriage" was long regarded as absurd, if
not oxymoronic. And inasmuch as marriage was also seen as the indispen-
sable cornerstone of validity, same-sex couples also met with failure in tort
cases in which their relationships swam directly into view. Over time,
though, both visibility and the vocabulary needed to describe it have moved
same-sex couples ever closer to formal, legal equality. Private arrange-
ments, by contrast, have moved somewhat more quickly towards equal
treatment.
Focusing on early efforts to persuade courts to recognize gay relation-
ships-either as marriages, or as worthy of recognition in the torts context,
or as proper subjects of support agreements-I begin by showing that
courts were effectively tongue-tied: Marriages between same-sex couples
could not be recognized because they were not, after all, marriages. Fur-
ther, inasmuch as marriage was long seen as the only legitimate home for
intimacy, efforts by both same-sex and opposite-sex couples to have their
relationships recognized also met with failure in the torts context. This
view of same-sex marriages exists yet today, most obviously in states that
have banned same-sex marriages through legislation or constitutional
amendment, more subtly in judicial decisions that restrict the fundamental
right to marry to opposite-sex marriages.
While courts would not recognize same-sex marriages for any pur-
poses, a body of law was at the same time developing that did accede to
reality in some ways, often by protecting private economic arrangements.
Thus, this Article proceeds chronologically, describing the quickening pace
of change, of both rights and the language used to describe and enforce
them-from private arrangements, to limited recognition as domestic part-
nerships or within the context of specific statutes, to the virtual equivalence
of civil unions, to marriage. Not surprisingly, given the prominent role
played by state law in these areas, many points along the continuum can be
identified, from little recognition of same-sex relationships all the way
2009]
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through to full marriage rights and recognition in tort law. Yet even the
most retrograde of states has had to make some accommodation to the real-
ity of openly gay lives. It is therefore likely that full and universal marriage
equality is not far off, although resistance has been especially firm on this
one issue.
II. THE 1970S AND 1980s: JUDICIAL (NON-)RECOGNITION OF SAME-SEX
UNIONS
A. Early Marriage Equality Cases and their Societal Context
Perhaps emboldened by the nascent gay rights movement, a few
groundbreaking couples did challenge the states' universal proscription of
same-sex marriages. As has been chronicled many times, their efforts were
dismally unsuccessful. In 1971, the Minnesota Supreme Court quickly and
unanimously dismissed plaintiffs' constitutional and statutory arguments,
relying on dictionary definitions of marriage and upholding the law as a
rational classification supported by centuries of tradition. 10 One searches in
vain for any discussion of the conclusion that the court simply asserted. In
1974, a Washington appellate court threw out a similar constitutional chal-
lenge to the state's exclusionary marriage law.11 Although the decision is
longer than the Minnesota court's holding, and ostensibly supported by
more authority, in fact its basic argument consisted of little more than a
quote from the Minnesota decision and a tautological statement that "mar-
riage in this state, as elsewhere in the nation, has been deemed a private
relationship of a man and a woman (husband and wife) which involves
'interests of basic importance in our society.' ' 12 Simply put, at this time
courts were unwilling to challenge the very definition of marriage as it
been long understood, at least in the United States. In another case from
this same era, the Kentucky Supreme Court summarized this uncritical
position: "[M]arriage has always been considered as the union of a man
and a woman... It appears to us that appellants are prevented from marry-
ing ... by their own incapability of entering into a marriage as that term is
defined." 13
These early decisions reveal courts that were simply without the back-
ground or language to soberly address the claims before them. Reading
them alongside the more recent spate of cases faced with marriage equality
10. Baker v. Nelson, 191 N.W.2d 185 (Minn. 1971).
11. Singer v. Hara, 522 P.2d 1187 (Wash. Ct. App. 1974).
12. Id. at 1197 (quoting Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371, 376 (1971)).
13. Jones v. Hallahan, 501 S.W.2d 588, 589 (Ky. 1973).
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arguments, one is struck by the difference in tone, in analysis, and in re-
spect. This latter set of cases, discussed more fully in Part IV.B., starts
from the presumption that the claimants have advanced serious equality
and liberty arguments that require careful consideration, even if the ulti-
mate results are not always different from those reached in the earlier cases.
But in the 1970s, openly gay lives were still rare, and claims to full partici-
pation in society were in their infancy. The 1969 Stonewall riots, often (but
perhaps too easily) cited as the crucible from which the gay rights move-
ment emerged, were still recent and raw. The nascent movement quickly
became divided between radicals who questioned the legal structure, rules,
and entitlements of marriage (among many other things) and more assimi-
lationist liberals, who sought formal legal equality for their relationships. In
a paradoxical way, radical ideology, while causing more discomfort to
mainstream society, was less of a challenge to courts, whose power to ef-
fect change on such a scale is quite limited. Liberal claims to equality, even
in marriage, were more alarming because they adapt the language and sub-
stance of rights and equality to new circumstances, thereby challenging
judicial decision-makers to address the arguments directly. As shown
above, judges avoided doing so in any comprehensive way. Given the like-
lihood that many of these judges had no acquaintanceship with openly gay
people-much less with gay couples in intimate relationships-it is hardly
surprising they were unable to come to grips with claims for a status they
saw nowhere in evidence.
Such judicial blindness was even more pronounced in the area of
harms to relational interests caused by personal injury or death. The torts of
wrongful death and loss of consortium expressly require consideration of
relationships, while one formulation of the requirements for a successful
suit for negligent infliction of emotional harm also calls upon courts to
assess the strength of relationships. 14 Yet two phenomena are striking in
this area of the law, at least until very recently. First, courts called upon to
assess the claims of unmarried cohabitants for the loss of, or injury to, their
intimate companions often routinely and reflexively denied the claims-no
matter the strength of the relationship before them. Second, and perhaps
still more surprising, almost no same-sex couples even sought recovery for
these injuries in the first place. Each of these statements needs expansion,
14. Currently, some states allow witnesses to serious injury caused to another to recover for their
emotional distress even if these witnesses did not themselves fear harm, but only if the witnesses and
the person physically injured stand in a close relationship. See DAN B. DOBBS, THE LAW OF TORTS
§ 309 (2000) (summarizing various views). Thus, the question arises as to what qualifies as a "close
relationship." Until recently, intimate relationships not of the blood counted as "close" only if cemented
by marriage. See notes 32-36 and accompanying text infra for a fuller discussion.
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but I must begin by asking the reader's patience during a discussion of the
claims of opposite-sex cohabitants. My reasons for doing so will become
clear soon.
B. Early Tort and Support Claims by Unmarried Cohabitants for
Relational Injury
The denial of recovery to those not in marital relationships is most de-
fensible in the case of wrongful death. For historical reasons not pertinent
here, wrongful death claims are entirely statutory. Most statutes strictly
limit the class of those entitled to recover for the negligently caused death
of another; typically, spouses and immediate family members are included,
while others are not. 15 Thus, surviving intimates who were never married to
their now-deceased partners have seldom bothered to even file claims un-
der these laws. Those that did were routinely unsuccessful. 16 The claims
were brought by opposite-sex couples, but there is little reason to think that
the results would have been much different in the case of same-sex couples,
because in neither case does the plaintiff meet the statutory definition of
"'spouse."
Matters are more complex in the cases of loss of consortium and neg-
ligent infliction of emotional distress, because neither claim confronts a
statutory prohibition against recovery. Consortium claims, once available
only to a husband for the loss of his wife's services because of her injury at
defendant's hands, have since evolved into a more encompassing balm for
the loss of society and sexual relations (with "services" taking on an ever-
smaller role). 17 Inasmuch as only husbands were "entitled" to services,
limiting recovery to those in sanctioned marriages was justified by the real-
ity of the marital relationship and its unique ability to command certain
duties of the spouses inter se.18 But the elements of recovery today are
meant to reflect the reality of the relationship as lived, and the injury to
both its tangible and less quantifiable merits. One might therefore expect
15. See John G. Culhane, A "Clanging Silence": Same-Sex Couples and Tort Law, 89 KY. L. J.
911, 955-56 nn.209-12 (2001) (citing representative list of then-current statutes and those entitled to
recovery in various categories of family relationships).
16. See id. at 957-60 (discussing three California cases that denied wrongful death claims brought
by surviving partners in cohabiting relationships).
17. Ezemack v. Progressive Sec. Ins. Co., 899 So. 2d 870, 871 (La. Ct. App. 2005).
18. It hardly needs stating that, to a modern sensibility, the institution of marriage as it existed for
centuries is not one that almost anyone would claim allegiance to today. Among its dismal hallmarks
were the legal disappearance of the wife, the concomitant supremacy of the husband, and the virtual
impossibility of exit even for what most would agree today would be good grounds for dissolution.
Accessible summaries of these points are found in HARRY D. KRAUSE ET AL., FAMILY LAW 97-101,
551-57 (5th ed. 2003).
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courts to undertake a more searching examination of all intimate relation-
ships for harms suffered. 19
Yet in case after case, courts in California and elsewhere dismissed
such claims, thereby foreclosing any effort by the consortium plaintiff to
demonstrate that, in fact, the loss suffered might be just as acute as any
incurred by a married plaintiff. Judicial support of this strict rule combined
concern about the practical difficulties of assessing the strength of a non-
marital relationship with language about the state's interest in fostering
marriage-as though allowing tort recovery in such cases would undermine
that interest. The language of the California Supreme Court in Elden v.
Sheldon20 (a case to which we shall have occasion to return) is both typical
and instructive:
Marriage is accorded [a special] degree of dignity in recognition that
"[t]he joining of the man and woman in marriage is at once the most so-
cially productive and individually fulfilling relationship that one can en-
joy in the course of a lifetime." 21
[T]he policy favoring marriage is "rooted in the necessity of providing
an institutional basis for defining the fundamental relational rights and
responsibilities of persons in organized society."'22 Formally married
couples are granted significant rights and bear important responsibilities
toward one another which are not shared by those who cohabit without
marriage.... Plaintiff does not suggest a convincing reason why cohab-
iting unmarried couples, who do not bear such legal obligations toward
one another, should be permitted to recover for injuries to their partners
to the same extent as those who undertake these responsibilities.
By this account, the special treatment of marriage is-and must be-
so pervasive that not even claims that are formally independent of it can be
recognized if they tend to weaken marriage even hypothetically.
That loss of consortium claims were so tied to the legal relationship of
19. There is also an argument for considering harms to non-intimate relationships, such as those
between adult siblings who live together, long-time (non-intimate) friends, and so on. Indeed, the
possibility of such relationships being considered has been pressed into the service of the "slippery
slope" argument against extending loss of consortium claims beyond the clear boundaries of legally
sanctioned marriage. See, e.g., Borer v. Am. Airlines, 563 P.2d 858, 861-62 (Cal. 1977):
Patricia Borer, for example, foreseeably has not only a husband ... and the children who sue
here, but also parents[,] ... brothers, sisters, cousins, inlaws, friends, colleagues, and other
acquaintances who will be deprived of her companionship. No one suggests that all such per-
sons possess a right of action for loss of Patricia's consortium; all agree that somewhere a line
must be drawn.
Id.
20. 758 P.2d 582 (Cal. 1988).
21. Id. at 586 (quoting Nieto v. City of Los Angeles, 188 Cal. Rptr. 31 (Cal. Ct. App. 1982)).
22. Id. at 587 (quoting Laws v. Griep, 332 N.W.2d 339, 341 (Iowa 1983)).
23. Id.
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marriage (and not the reality of the relationship, or the injury) might owe
something to the history of the tort. But no such history accounts for
courts' similar treatment of claims based on the negligent infliction of emo-
tional distress. Under the rules for recovery in some states, including Cali-
fornia, one may recover for purely emotional distress caused by witnessing
an injury to a loved one as long as the plaintiff stands in a sufficiently close
relationship with the primary victim. 24 Since the courts only recently de-
vised the requirements for this tort, one might expect a flexible and evolv-
ing approach to defining "close relationship." But while the California
intermediate appellate courts did occasionally show such flexibility,25 El-
den v. Sheldon again wrote the plaintiffs' relationship out of the law. In-
deed, the statement from the case that was quoted above is taken from the
court's discussion of the emotional distress claim (although it expressly
adopted the same rationale in its consideration of the consortium claim.)
A moment's reflection should indicate the absurdity of the court's
marriage-promoting rationale in the case of emotional distress claims:
Unlike consortium claims, which at least retain a foothold in the realm of
service (to which only spouses had the right), the tort of emotional distress
is to compensate for the mental harm caused by the injury to someone with
whom one is emotionally close. Although matters of administrative con-
venience might justify a bright-line rule, it is hard to see how a marriage-
promotion argument does. The tort is not connected, except by the court's
say-so, to "the rights and obligations of marriage," nor would allowing
recovery to anyone who could show actual emotional injury undermine the
institution. Even today, most courts continue to screen out such claims for
both loss of consortium and emotional distress, although some have looked
to the reality of relationships in allowing such cases to survive dismissal. 26
Perhaps administrative convenience is indeed the driving force behind
judicial refusal to recognize the claims of unmarried intimates. To the ex-
tent that reluctance to encourage non-marital relationships is in play,
though, these decisions are harder to explain. California again provides an
instructive example of judicial confusion: Although the Elden v. Sheldon
24. See Thing v. LaChusa, 771 P.2d 814 (Cal. 1989).
25. See Ledger v. Tippitt, 210 Cal. Rptr. 814 (Cal. Ct. App. 1985) (upholding dismissal of loss of
consortium claim but reversing dismissal of negligent infliction of emotional distress claim); Butcher v.
Superior Court, 188 Cal. Rptr. 503 (Cal. Ct. App. 1983) (loss of consortium). But see Drew v. Drake,
168 Cal. Rptr. 65 (Cal. Ct. App. 1980) (upholding dismissal of emotional distress claim).
26. Several states now have statutes that, by approximating marriage, allow same-sex couples to
sue if they are in a state-sanctioned relationship, but cohabitants mostly remain outside of tort law's
protections for injuries to relational interests. See infra Part IV.C. For a discussion of the few cases
allowing claims to proceed, see John G. Culhane, Even More Wrongful Death: Statutes Divorced from
Reality, 32 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 171,190-94 (2005).
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court waxed rhapsodic about the value and privilege of marriage-and the
danger in sending any signal that might compromise its status-that same
California Supreme Court had, more than a decade earlier, issued the pro-
gressive and influential decision in Marvin v. Marvin,27 which permitted an
unmarried cohabitant to claim support on a variety of different bases: ex-
press contract; implied contract; quantum meruit; or other equitable reme-
dies, including constructive trusts. 28 This decision, expressly rejected by
other courts precisely because of the negative effect it was deemed likely to
have on marriage, 29 was mentioned only in an unrelated note in the Elden
court majority, but formed a central pillar of the dissent's case that societal
realities and the requirements of fairness dictated a more flexible approach.
One central difference between the support cases and the tort claims
discussed above is that the former involve only agreements between the
parties, while the latter necessarily bring in third parties, as do claims by
unmarried cohabitants for government benefits. Inasmuch as private par-
ties, even those in "meretricious relationships," enjoy the freedom to enter
into contracts with each other, refusing to recognize such contractual
agreements (express or implied) where the subject is support rather than
something else (such as the sale of a good) requires first overriding the
default, contract-friendly rule and then drawing a possibly difficult line
between permissible and impermissible subjects of agreement.
Thus, in the realm of private ordering, courts are able to import terms
and doctrine from contract law, thereby diminishing the focus on the under-
lying relationship that causes disquiet. Indeed, the Marvin court took pains
to assure us that consideration for the agreement could not be based on the
sexual relationship itself, thereby directing focus to the kind of economic
support that even non-intimate cohabitants might rely on.30
By contrast, even in its modem guise the tort of consortium is and
continues to be bound up in the family relationship, and, at least until quite
recently, families were carefully defined to exclude those without connec-
tion of law or blood. In the legal context, of course, that connection is
27. 18 Cal. 3d 660 (Cal. 1976).
28. Id. at 665.
29. See, e.g., Hewitt v. Hewitt, 394 N.E.2d 1204, (111. 1979). The court asks:
Will the fact that legal rights closely resembling those arising from conventional marriages
can be acquired by those who deliberately choose to enter into what have heretofore been
commonly reffered to as 'illicit' or 'meretricious' relationships encourage formation of such
relationships and weaken marriage as the foundation of our family-based society?
Id. at 1207. A typical middle ground approach is evidenced in Connell v. Francisco, 898 P.2d 831
(Wash. 1995) (holding that only property that would have been community property in a "real"
marriage is subject to equitable distribution).
30. Marvin, 18 Cal. 3d at 674.
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"marriage" and none other. Emotional distress claims were ensnared by this
same outmoded view.
C. Tort Claims by Same-Sex Couples for Relational Injury
With opposite-sex couples walled off from recovery in tort, one might
expect that same-sex couples would have done even worse. In fact, they did
but the direct evidence for this claim is hard to come by for a simple rea-
son: Very few cases were even brought. While the tort claims of opposite-
sex unmarried cohabitants were disfavored, those of same-sex couples were
largely invisible.
Elsewhere, I have detailed the likely reasons for the lack of appellate
law addressing the claims by members of same-sex couples for loss of con-
sortium and negligent infliction of emotional distress; 31 I summarize these
reasons here. First, at least until quite recently, and even to an extent today,
many same-sex couples might omit to disclose or "edit" their relationship
in discussing their case with an attorney. Second, the attorney might choose
not to mention the possibility of such derivative claims to the client(s) (an
action that might raise ethical concerns, depending on the law of the rele-
vant state), or might at least dissuade the couple from pursuing the consor-
tium or emotional distress claims. Such dissuasion might make practical
sense, because the primary, personal injury claim is the most valuable, and,
given a combination of the dearth of legal precedent and a potentially hos-
tile judge or jury, many fully informed couples might choose not to com-
promise the more financially important claim for a less valuable and more
uncertain one. Although there are differences between the two claims-
consortium necessarily compensates for injury to the relationship itself,
while emotional distress uses the relationship somewhat less directly-
these seem minor compared to the daunting similarities discussed above.
Indeed, research of cases from the 1970s and 1980s disclosed no
claims for loss of same-sex consortium, and only one for negligently in-
flicted emotional distress. With opposite-sex couples encountering courts
unable to separate relational injury from marriage, same-sex couples un-
surprisingly lagged still further behind. The one appellate case involving
emotional distress makes the point dramatically.
In Coon v. Joseph,32 plaintiff Gary Coon and his "intimate male
friend" (to use the court's term), known to us only as "Ervin," were at-
tempting to board a municipal bus in San Francisco when the bus driver,
31. Culhane, supra note 15, at 974-79.
32. 192 Cal. App. 3d 1269 (Cal. Ct. App. 1987).
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defendant Michael Joseph, allegedly "verbally abused Ervin and struck his
face. When [Coon] observed the assault on his friend, he suffered
great ... emotional distress. '33 Coon sought relief under several causes of
action, including intentional and negligent infliction of emotional distress.
In affirming the lower court's dismissal of the entire complaint, the
court found that, for purposes of the negligent infliction of emotional dis-
tress claim, the plaintiff could not-as a matter of law-establish the "close
relation" required. In so deciding, the court avoided addressing the actual,
as opposed to legal, strength of the relationship. Coon alleged that he and
Ervin had an "intimate, stable and 'emotionally significant' relationship as
'exclusive life partners,"' and that the two had been living together for a
year.34 Given the sketchiness of the court's description, it is difficult to
assess whether Coon and Ervin had the sort of long-term, committed rela-
tionship that might serve as a "substitute" for marriage by a sympathetic
court. The court's approach, though, made a fuller description unnecessary.
A benign reading of the decision is that the court was simply more
comfortable with a bright-line rule.35Several statements made by the court,
however, suggest that the true discomfort-or at least the greater extent of
it-was with a same-sex couple, not with the broader category of unmar-
ried couples. First, the court referred to Coon's life partner as his "male
friend," and, as noted above, did not deign to provide his full name. 36 This
"de-sexing" of the couple was further evidenced by the court's citation to a
statement in Prosser and Keeton's Torts hornbook that was of little applica-
tion in this case:
It would be an entirely unreasonable burden on all human activity if the
defendant ... were to be compelled to pay for the lacerated feelings of
every other person disturbed by reason of it, including every bystander
shocked at an accident, and every distant relative of the person injured,
as well as all his friends.37
Whatever the exact nature of the relationship between Coon and
Ervin, it bore no resemblance to any of the remote parties to whom Prosser
rightly feared extending recovery. But the court's reliance on this passage
is of a piece with its overall treatment of the couple, and its willingness to
elevate the often transient parent- foster child relationship over that of a
33. Id. at 1272.
34. Id.
35. Indeed, the court cited a number of cases interpreting the close relationship requirement
narrowly, as requiring either husband-wife, parent-child, or grandchild-grandparent. Id. at 1275. The
two, or maybe three, cases to the contrary were regarded as "exceptions," and either ignored, explained
away, or disapproved. Id.
36. Id. at 1272.
37. W. KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON LAW OF TORTS § 54, at 366 (5th ed. 1984).
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committed couple: "We view the relationship of mother and foster
child.. . as a parent-child relationship. '38
The court's negation of the intimate life of the couple is obvious
enough from its holding and from the analysis above, but additional lan-
guage from the decision supports my point that the idea of same-sex mar-
riage was simply unfathomable to courts at this time. The court
distinguished the couple before it from an opposite-sex couple in Ledger v.
Tippitt, where a California appellate court had permitted an emotional dis-
tress claim by an unmarried cohabitant to go forward .39. Rather than simply
disapproving the holding in that case-which other appellate courts had
done, and which the California Supreme Court was about to do-the Coon
court emphasized those facts from Ledger that it found sympathetic, most
significantly including the couple's having "establish[ed] a home with their
natural child."'40 It then stated that, unlike the Ledger case, the case before
it did not involve a "de facto" marriage, "[n]or could such allegation be
made because appellant and Ervin are both males and the Legislature has
made a determination that a legal marriage is between a man and a
woman."
41
This language is quite revealing as to the state of non-recognition in
which same-sex couples encountered the law. So vertiginous was the idea
of a same-sex marriage, apparently, that it disabled the court from seeing
that, once it recognizes any "de facto" marriage, it cannot then use the leg-
islative definition of marriage, without more, to exclude same-sex couples.
Moreover, the court was blind to the unfairness of a legal system that
would first deny marriage rights to same-sex couples, and then use that
denial to erase gay men and lesbians from other areas of legal protection.
Indeed, a court less at sea might have been able to recognize that same-sex
couples, deprived of the option to marry, were more sympathetic candi-
dates for relaxing the bright-line, marriage-only rule.42
D. Support Agreements Between Same-Sex Partners
As noted above, Marvin v. Marvin established, at least for California,
the enforceability of express and implied private support contracts, so long
as such contracts were not based on impermissible consideration (i.e., as
38. Coon, 192 Cal. App. 3d at 1275 n.l.
39. 164 Cal. App. 3d 625 (Cal. Ct. App. 1985).
40. Coon, 192 Cal. App. 3d at 1276-77.
41. Id. at 1278.
42. The statement in the text should not be taken to indicate a position favoring the bright-line
rule; such a reflexive rule is unfair to committed opposite-sex couples, as well.
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long as support was not seen as payment for sex). In the case of same-sex
couples, by contrast, courts struggled to reconcile seemingly incompatible
notions: the increasing presence of same-sex couples and the reality of their
needs upon separation, on the one hand, with continued judicial discomfort
with arrangements and "lifestyles" they were often wholly unfamiliar with.
A brief discussion of a pair of California appellate cases stand in in-
structive contrast, and makes the point.
In Jones v. Daly, the parties had agreed that plaintiff would render his
services to Daly as "a lover, companion, homemaker, traveling companion,
housekeeper and cook. '43 The court found that the agreement was based in
large part ("indeed the predominant consideration") on sexual services, and
was therefore invalid."'44 In Whorton v. Dillingham,45 on the other hand, a
different California appellate court did permit severance of the illegal con-
sideration from the bulk of other tasks the plaintiff claimed he agreed to
perform in exchange for financial support, which included "chauffeur,
bodyguard, social and business secretary, partner and counselor in real
estate investments. '46 "Additionally, Whorton was to be Dillingham's con-
stant companion, confidant, traveling and social companion, and lover. '47
While the list of "occupations" in Whorton is considerably more compre-
hensive than that in Jones, the Whorton court found such services as
"chauffeur" to be those for which people typically get paid, and therefore
compensable. 48 The Jones court, on the other hand, refused to so regard the
plaintiff's efforts as "housekeeper" or "cook. '49
As has been discussed throughout this section of the Article, courts
during the 1970s and 1980s were quite uncomfortable with same-sex rela-
tionships, and Jones shows that such discomfort could even upend other-
wise valid agreements between same-sex partners. The problem seems to
have been the term lover: "[T]he words 'cohabitating' and 'lover' do not
have the innocuous meanings which plaintiff ascribes to them. These terms
can pertain only to plaintiffs rendition of sexual services to Daly. ''50 Since
the plaintiff in Jones did not permit the court to avert its attention from
intimacy, he was punished by having that intimacy extended outward to
engulf, and so to extinguish, otherwise compensable claims.
43. 122 Cal. App. 3d 500, 505 (Cal. Ct. App. 1981).
44. Id. at 508.
45. 202 Cal. App. 3d 447 (Cal. Ct. App. 1988).
46. Id. at 450.
47. Id.
48. Id. at 454.
49. Jones, 122 Cal. App. 3d at 509.
50. Id. at 508.
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Would a different term have yielded a more sympathetic approach?
Husband and wife would have worked, apparently; in Marvin v. Marvin,
the court effectively held that the words "husband and wife" did not mean
that sexual relations were part of the "package" of services. 51 Perhaps the
more business-like "partner" would have worked, inasmuch as the court
seemed fixated on the word "lover" and its obvious connection to sexual
intimacy. The irony, of course, is that the parties' word choices were con-
strained by the legal system's unwillingness to recognize their relationship
in the first place.
But perhaps the juxtaposition of these cases heralded a change to-
wards greater recognition for same-sex relationships. For in addition to the
rather occupational-sounding tasks listed in Whorton, the agreement there
also included the word "lover"-albeit at the end of the string, rather than
at the beginning. Given the speed with which the lives of same-sex couples
were emerging into view during this period, the seven-year lapse between
Jones (1981) and Whorton (1988) may explain as much as any other pur-
ported justification for the difference in result.
III. THE 1990S: SLOW PROGRESS, QUICK BACKLASH
By the 1990s, gay and lesbian people were streaming out of the
closet.52 This accelerating emergence spilled into the legal arena in two of
the areas under discussion: marriage equality and private support agree-
ments. And while common law torts remained quiet, an increasing boldness
and financial need did begin to result in wrongful death suits-which began
to have at least some modicum of success, despite the high statutory hurdle.
A. The Marriage Equality Debate Enters the National Conversation
As with the early marriage cases, 53 the first to gain notoriety in the
1990's was filed by a couple acting on its own initiative-not strategically
hand-picked by legal advocacy groups to present the strongest possible
factual and legal arguments. Indeed, such advocacy groups feared such
suits because of their potential to create unwelcome precedent. That said,
the plaintiffs could hardly have picked a better state than Hawaii in which
51. 18 Cal. 3d 660, 669-74 (Cal. 1976).
52. See R. BRADLEY SEARS & M.V. LEE BADGETT, THE WILLIAMS INSTITUTE, SAME-SEX
COUPLES AND SAME-SEX COUPLES RAISING CHILDREN IN THE UNITED STATES: DATA FROM CENSUS
2000 (2004), http://www.law.ucia.edu/williamsinstitute/publications/CalifomrniaCouplesReport.pdf.
53. Such unsuccessful cases continued to be filed throughout the 1980s and until and beyond the
time that the case discussed in the text succeeded. For a listing of such cases, see WILLIAM N.
ESKRIDGE, JR. & NAN D. HUNTER, SEXUALITY, GENDER, AND THE LAW 803 n.f (1997) (listing cases).
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to challenge their exclusion from the institution of marriage: the state was
heavily Democratic, and was known for a multicultural tradition that might
have seemed receptive to this sort of equality argument. Moreover, the
court itself had a reputation as progressive. This reputation continued with
Baehr v. Lewin,54 the case that showed, in result, the gains that the GLBT
community had by 1993 made; rhetorically, the decision reveals a court
beginning to reflect a transition in the broader society.
In Baehr, the Hawaii Supreme Court took the then-astonishing posi-
tion55 that the state needed a compelling reason to deny a same-sex couple
a marriage license, and remanded the case to the lower court to determine
whether that standard could be met. Yet the court so held not because
same-sex couples were said to have a fundamental right to marry, but be-
cause denying the license in such cases presumptively amounted to imper-
missible sex discrimination in violation of the equal rights amendment to
the Hawaii state constitution. Although this holding is potentially radical
from a gender-equality point of view, 56 it steps away from "the gay issue";
indeed, the court made that point explicitly in stating that a same-sex cou-
ple need not even be homosexual.57 In so doing, the court was able to an-
chor its holding in a principle for which there was widespread agreement-
gender equality-while achieving a more controversial civil rights result.
From a short-term perspective, the Hawaii Supreme Court's decision
was worse than a failure; it was a debacle. Once the trial court found, in
1996, that the high hurdle imposed by the equal rights amendment had not
been cleared,58 a cascade of reactions more than undid the result. The Ha-
waii legislature proposed an amendment to the state's constitution that
would allow the legislature to define marriage and the union of a man and a
woman that was then overwhelmingly approved by voters, thereby mooting
the courts' holdings. 59 More significantly, the United States Congress
54. 852 P.2d 44 (Haw. 1993).
55. "As of 1993, not a single judge or state attorney general had expressed an opinion that same-
sex marriage is required by any principle of law." ESKRIDGE, JR. & HUNTER, supra note 53, at 803.
56. This notion of exclusion of same-sex couples from marriage as gender discrimination was
substantially fleshed out by Justice Johnson in her opinion in Baker v. State, 744 A.2d 864 (Vt. 1999),
in which she concurred in the holding that denying same-sex couples the benefit of marriage violated
the state's equality guarantee but dissented from the holding that the situation could be remedied by
offering a marriage "equivalent," such as the civil union that was ultimately adopted. For a detailed
analysis of this concurring opinion, see John G. Culhane, A Tale of Two Concurrences: Same-Sex
Marriage and Products Liability, 7 WM. & MARY J. WOMEN & L. 447,458-71 (2001).
57. Baehr, 852 P.2d at 51.
58. Lynn D. Wardle, Same-Sex Marriage: The Ruling in Baehr v. Miike, NAT'L LAW. ASS'N
REV., Winter 1996, http://www.nla.org/winter96/pg5.html.




passed (and President Clinton signed) the so-called Defense of Marriage
Act (DOMA), 60 a 1996 statute that did two things: (1) expressly permitted
states to refuse recognition of same-sex marriages performed and valid in
other states; and (2) defined marriage as the union of a man and a woman
for federal purposes. In addition, many states quickly acted to pass their
own versions of DOMA, statutorily defining marriage so as to exclude
same-sex couples. 61
The sober analysis of the Hawaii Supreme Court was of a piece with a
1996 decision by the United States Supreme Court. In Romer v. Evans,62 a
solid majority of the Court held that a Colorado state constitutional
amendment that prohibited local government from enacting gay-friendly
legislation, and that disallowed discrimination claims based on sexual ori-
entation, was in defiance of the constitutional promise of equal protection
under the laws. As we have seen, however, these progressive moves by the
courts were at odds with much of the popular will; after all, it was the vot-
ers of Colorado who had approved the sweeping anti-gay amendment. The
plebiscite had been drafted by the virulently anti-gay Colorado for Family
Values, whose campaign in favor of passage had employed a typical litany
of extreme, and false, statements: Gay men were AIDS-infected and died
young; "homosexuals" tried to recruit children- "maybe even your own";
and basic civil rights protections, when extended to gays, were "special
rights."63
Baehr and Romer, on the one hand, and DOMA and the Colorado
amendment, taken together, suggest a rift between courts and the public's
view-a rift that persists to this day. As the debate over DOMA demon-
strated, even at the national level politicians shared-or were willing to
accede to--constituents' views on the meaning and reach of marriage and
its rights. Yet the rhetoric employed during the DOMA debate indicates a
transition to a more tolerant and respectful view of the GLBT community;
the focus of many of the comments was on the tradition of marriage, and on
its perceived definitional (and therefore immutable) imperatives, rather
than on negative stereotypes about gays. Remarks of this type dominated
the discourse, but voices both more progressive and more reactionary were
also heard-not surprising during a time of transition when many Ameri-
cans were coming to know gay and lesbian people and the reality of their
60. 28 U.S.C. § 1738C (2006).
61. See Nancy J. Knauer, Same-Sex Marriage and Federalism, 17 TEMP. POL. & CIV. RTS. L. REV.
421,433(2008).
62. 517 U.S. 620, 631-32 (1996).
63. WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR., DISHONORABLE PASSIONS 280 (2008) (citing source materials).
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lives, while others wished to deny this changed reality. A few examples
from the debate over DOMA will serve to illustrate these points.
As noted, the forces of relative moderation held sway, reflecting the
emerging view that gays-and their behavior-should be tolerated but that
such toleration should not translate into tampering with the mainstream's
perceived prerogatives-especially marriage. Typical of this line of defense
was the comment by Representative Seastrand that "[t]raditional mar-
riage ... is a house built on a rock. As shifting sands of public opinion and
prevailing winds of compromise damage other institutions, marriage en-
dures, and so must its historically legal definition."64 In a somewhat similar
vein, Florida's Representative Canady expressed the view that "[flamilies
are not merely constructs of outdated convention, and traditional marriage
laws were not based on animosity toward homosexuals. '65 Cementing the
point that toleration holds the majority in a superior position, Rep. Canady
added: "Our law should not treat homosexual relationships as the moral
equivalent of the heterosexual relationships on which the family is
based.",66
Similarly, in the Senate even conservative Texas Senator Phil Gramm
emphasized the historical and traditional role of marriage, declining to be
drawn into denigration of gay and lesbian people: "Human beings have
always given traditional marriage a special sanction. Not that there cannot
be contracts among individuals, but there is something unique about the
traditional family in terms of what it does for our society and the founda-
tion it provides... ",67
These anodyne support statements for traditional marriage were
hemmed in on both sides by more virulent anti-gay rhetoric and more pro-
gressive voices. Some, such as North Carolina Senator Lauch Faircloth,
offered unsupported pronouncements that "[s]ame-sex unions do not make
strong families. ' 68 In a similar vein, Sen. Robert Byrd of West Virginia
blithely stated that, "out of same-sex relationships ... emotional bonding
64. 142 CONG. REC. H7484 (daily ed. July 12, 1996) (statement of Rep. Seastrand).
65. 142 CONG. REC. H7441 (daily ed. July 11, 1996) (statement of Rep. Canaway).
66. Id.
67. 142 CONG. REC. S10106 (daily ed. Sept. 10, 1996) (statement of Sen. Gramm).
68. Id. at S 10117 (statement of Sen. Faircloth). Senator Faircloth also made a separate, and logi-
cally incoherent, point. To the extent that same-sex couples complained that exclusion from marriage
was burdensome because of the denial of benefits that the status confers, their claim had no merit
because benefits are not a good reason to marry. Id. Well, if benefits are not supposed to provide at least
some incentive to marry, why are they offered to anyone in the first place? And to the extent that bene-
fits are intended not as incentive but to encourage and support the flourishing of existing marriages, we
are brought back, full-circle, to the independent question of who should be allowed to marry (and why).
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oftentimes does not take place... ",69 Others, such as Rep. Lamar Smith of
Texas, reflected a more openly hostile view, declaring that "same sex 'mar-
riages' demean the fundamental institution of marriage. They legitimize
unnatural and immoral behavior. ' 70 (Note the single quotes around the
word "marriage," a well-known signal that the statement's author regards
same-sex marriages as oxymoronic.) Never to be outdone in the tone and
strength of his old-school homophobia, Sen. Jesse Helms of North Carolina
offered the eye-rolling reference to "Adam and Eve-not Adam and
Steve," and hoped that Congress would reject homosexuals' effort at "le-
gitimizing their behavior. ' 71 Further, some DOMA supporters, without
factual support, invoked the interests of children as supporting the exclu-
sion of same-sex couples from marriage. 72
Despite these comments, and the rather lopsided votes in both cham-
bers of Congress, 73 a number of statements indicate an increasing aware-
ness of the legitimacy of at least some of the points made in support of
marriage equality. Some such statements came from supporters of the
measure who were attempting to balance the religious understanding of
marriage with the secular reality of benefits conferred. Senator Bill Brad-
ley, for instance, augured the "virtual marriage" status of the civil union in
stating that:
[M]arriage with all its religious connotations is different from a secular
desire to get housing or a good job. So ... in trying to balance the reli-
gious and historical idea of marriage with the need for extending rights, I
say that rights should extend up to but not include recognition of same-
sex marriages. 74
Others went further, seeing same-sex marriages as consistent with the em-
phasis on commitment supposedly fueling the DOMA. As Representative
Meehan of Massachusetts stated:
Our society encourages and values a commitment to long-term monoga-
mous relationships-and we honor those commitments by creating the
legal institution of marriage. If we then deny the right of marriage to a
69. Id. at S10109 (daily ed. Sept. 10, 1996) (statement of Sen. Byrd).
70. 142 CONG. REC. H7494 (daily ed. July 12, 1996) (statement of Rep. Smith).
71. 142 CONG. REc. S10068 (daily ed. Sept. 9, 1996) (statement of Sen. Helms).
72. For example, referring to legislative findings that marriage "promotes the interests of chil-
dren," Senator Kempthome of Idaho stated that "we want to protect that institution." 142 Cong. Rec.
S 10116 (statement of Sen. Kempthome). By the time Congress debated the Federal Marriage Amend-
ment, discussed in Part IV.B., infra, the "interests of children" argument was ascendant.
73. The Senate supported DOMA by a vote of 85-14, while the result in the House was 342-67.
See U.S. Senate, Legislation and Records Home, http://www.senate.gov/legislative/LIS/roll-
calllists/rollcall-votecfm.cfm?congress=104&session=2&vote=00280 (last visited Apr. 10, 2009)
(Senate results); Final Vote Results For Role Call 316, http://clerk.house.gov/evs/1996/roll316.xml (last
visited Apr. 10, 2009) (House results).
74. 142 CONG. REc. S10125 (daily ed. Sept. 10, 1996) (statement of Sen. Bradley).
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segment of our population, we devalue their commitment without com-
pelling reasons... We can't have it both ways. Protecting everyone's
right to make a legal commitment to another is a defense of marriage. 75
Massachusetts Representative Barney Frank made a similar point:
"This notion that a loving relationship between two persons of the same sex
threatens relationships between two people of the opposite sex, that is what
denigrates heterosexual marriage."'76
Perhaps most progressive was Representative Sheila Jackson-Lee of
Texas, who noted that the DOMA was anchored in assumptions about mar-
riage and family that were "based on an antiquated notion .... Today, there
is no single definition of family that applies to all individuals." 77 After
providing a list of various kinds of families, Jackson-Lee concluded by
bringing in "individuals of the same sex living together and sharing their
lives as a couple. . ." She then called DOMA "unnecessary," and stated
that it "patently disregards the 1 4th Amendment [right to] equal protection
under the law."'78
B. Equality in Tort and Private Ordering Move (Sluggishly) Forward
These fascinating exchanges were to some extent mirrored in state-by-
state debates over DOMA, with legislators in most places reflecting the
conflicts of their constituents. Meanwhile, of course, actual same-sex cou-
ples had legal problems and obstacles in need of solution, with or without
the umbrella protection that full marriage equality would have provided.
Increasingly, attorneys worked with same-sex couples to create enforceable
support contracts, 79 and courts began to express willingness to honor these
contracts even where the relationship itself enjoyed no state sanction.
A telling example of a court's need and willingness to address the
support problems that plague many couples, straight and gay alike, is the
1992 decision by the Georgia Supreme Court in Crooke v. Gilden.80 There,
a couple-apparently without first names and without gender-were at
odds over an agreement they had entered into for sharing of expenses and
assets, as well as for the improvement of certain real estate. From an inde-
pendent source, one learns that the litigants were in fact a lesbian couple,81
75. 142 CONG. REC. H7486 (daily ed. July 12, 1996) (statement of Rep. Meehan).
76. 142 CONG. REC. H7447 (daily ed. July 11, 1996) (statement of Rep. Frank).
77. Id. at H7448 (statement of Rep. Jackson-Lee).
78. Id.
79. See, e.g., Posik v. Layton, 695 So.2d 759 (Fla. 1997) (describing and enforcing a complex
agreement between two women that was drawn up by an attorney).
80. 414 S.E.2d 645 (Ga. 1992).
81. Nancy Ehrenreich, The Progressive Potential in Privatization, 73 DENV. U. L. REv. 1235,
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but the court took pains to avoid disclosing anything about the parties or
their relationship. As to the defendant's claim that the contract was unen-
forceable because supported by "illegal consideration," the court found that
such consideration was "incidental" to the promised performances under
the contract, and permitted the remedy of partitioning the real property. As
the dissent pointed out, the majority's conclusion was not mandated by the
facts (which should have been entitled to deference). Crooke had testified
at trial that she would not have entered into the contract if not for the prom-
ise of the illegal activity, and apparently such testimony was unrebutted.
Although such testimony was obviously self-serving, the trial judge found
it credible; a finding, again, that would ordinarily not be second-guessed by
an appellate court. But the decision shows that, even in a state that still had
an anti-sodomy law, 82 same-sex couples were beginning to gain recogni-
tion.
This practical, problem-solving approach had an analogue in tort law
as well. Recall that wrongful death statutes are inhospitable to same-sex
couples, as these laws expressly qualify only named classes of beneficiaries
for recovery. In the 1990s, the categories always included spouses, but they
never included unmarried cohabitants, whether of the same sex or of the
opposite sex.8 3
Given that the wrongful death statutes are intended, in part, to com-
pensate those who relied on and could have been expected to continue re-
ceiving financial support from the decedent, it becomes obvious that the
narrow categories of eligible plaintiffs sometimes leaves a vital statutory
purpose unfilled. For example, a stay-at-home domestic partner would not
be able to recover a dime from the negligent actor whose actions resulted in
1249 (1996).
82. In Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986), the U.S. Supreme Court infamously upheld
Georgia's anti-sodomy law. The decision was later overruled, of course, by Lawrence v. Texas, 539
U.S. 558 (2003), and before that the Georgia Supreme Court had declared, in 1998, that this same law
was unconstitutional under Georgia's state constitutional guarantee of privacy. Powell v. State, 510
S.E.2d 18 (Ga. 1998). Still, in 1992, when Crooke v. Gilden was decided, even consensual sex between
two women was illegal.
83. In at least one state, though, such unmarried partners might qualify were they named as bene-
ficiaries in the decedent's will. MICH. COMp. LAWS ANN. § 600.2922(l)-(3)(c) (West 2008) ("[P]ersons
who may be entitled to damanges under this section shall be limited to ... [t]hose persons who are
devisees under the will of the deceased, except those whose relationship with the decedent violated
Michigan law..."). No cases have decided whether the language of the sentence's last clause would
disqualify the surviving member of a same-sex couple in light of Michigan's constitutional amendment
prohibiting same-sex marriages. The Michigan Constitution provides, in Article I, § 25: "To secure and
preserve the benefits of marriage for our society and for future generations of children, the union of one
man and one woman in marriage shall be the only agreement recognized as a marriage or similar union
for any purpose." MICH. CONST. art. 1, § 25. A recent Michigan State Supreme Court case, discussed in
Part IV.C., suggests an extremely broad interpretation of this amendment. See Nat'l. Pride at Work, Inc.
v. Governor of Mich., 748 N.W.2d 524 (Mich. 2008).
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the decedent partner's death, while the children and often even the parents
of this adult "child" would be able to recover if able to show compensable
loss.
Because of the devastating financial loss that the statute would other-
wise leave unremedied, it is perhaps not surprising that a few of these sur-
vivors brought suit in apparent defiance of the laws' clear language. In a
handful of appellate cases from the 1980s, those in opposite-sex relation-
ships had been unsuccessful. 84 At least in these cases, courts could rely on
the often-stated (but ultimately unpersuasive) argument that those who
deliberately forego the formality of legal marriage cannot complain when
they are unable to gain benefits associated with it. Of course, this argument
has no traction in the case of same-sex couples, who, in the 1990s, were
universally unable to marry. And at least two judges showed apparently
sympathy for the inextricable difficulty facing surviving members of such
couples. Their analyses and sympathies again show the emerging recogni-
tion of the reality of gay relationships.
In Solomon v. District of Columbia,85 the trial judge denied the Dis-
trict of Columbia's motion for summary judgment in a wrongful death case
brought by a woman whose lesbian partner had allegedly been killed
through the District's negligence. The District's motion was based on a
straightforward reading of the statute, which limited recovery to "spouse"
and "next of kin."' 86 The court, though, exploited the lack of an explicit
statutory definition of "next of kin" to find that the survivor qualified as
such, even though she could not be considered a spouse. While the result
was not strictly contradicted by a disqualifying definition of "next of kin,"
the court's result required disregarding the overall structure of the law of
intestacy. That law provides a comprehensive, and seemingly complete list
of those who qualify as next of kin; not surprisingly, surviving members of
intimate, but unmarried, couples are not included in that catalogue.8 7
Judge Dorsey achieved this questionable reading of the statute because
of her recognition of the reality of their lives, and the consequences of de-
nying recovery. On the former point, the court had this to say:
The relationship between Ms. Solomon and Ms. Lane [the decedent]
84. See, e.g., Matuz v. Gerardin Corp., 254 Cal. Rptr. 725 (Cal. Ct. App. 1989); Nieto v. City of
Los Angeles, 188 Cal. Rptr. 31 (Cal. Ct. App. 1982); Roe v. Ludtke Trucking, Inc., 732 P.2d 1021
(Wash. Ct. App. 1987).
85. Solomon v. District of Columbia, 21 FAM. L. REP. (BNA) 1305, 1316 (D.C. Apr. 26, 1995).
86. Id. The decision is reported only in the BNA Family Law Reporter and represents the re-
porter's synopsis of the case, not the exact language used by the judge. Quoted material is taken from
1995 LESBIAN/GAY L. NOTES 83 (1995).




contained all the attributes of a married couple but for the fact that it is a
same sex union that cannot be recognized with a marriage li-
cense... [T]his close relationship, coupled with the fact that they were
both legally recognized parents of the same two children leads the Court
to conclude that Ms. Solomon is the next of kin of Ms. Lane. 88
As to reality, Judge Dorsey clearly understood the artificiality of sepa-
rating the parenting role from the spousal one, especially since failure to
recognize the couple as such would have created an anomalous result: "It is
clear that the [couple's] two children are eligible to receive remedy pursu-
ant to the Wrongful Death Act... Since Ms. Solomon also relied on her
for support and maintenance, logic dictates that she is also entitled to reme-
dies... "89
In a dissenting opinion in Raum v. Restaurant Associates, Judge
Rosenberger showed similar sympathy for a surviving dependent in a
same-sex wrongful death case. First, he read the statute as ambiguous.
Then, he invoked other decisional law from New York that had reflected a
functional view of law over a literal one, and then used that approach to
broadly read a statute "whose purpose is to promote the public welfare, so
that homosexual couples will not be disadvantaged by their inability to give
their relationship a legal status." 90 He also noted that, in contrast to other
cases in which the court had declined to call same-sex partners "spouses," 91
"the wrongful-death statute makes no alternative provision for homosexual
dependents, which.., raises equal protection problems unless surviving
'spouse' is interpreted more broadly. '92
Dividing this article by decades suggests a tidiness of progress that has
been to an extent belied by the discussion within each section; these expo-
sitions reveal the complexity and ambiguity of political, social, and judicial
rules and rhetoric surrounding the integration of gay lives and relationships
into mainstream culture. Marriage is a cornerstone of such integration, so it
88. Solomon v. Dist. of Columbia, 1995 LESBIAN/GAY L. NOTES 83.
89. Id.
90. Raum v. Restaurant Assocs., Inc., 675 N.Y.S.2d 343, 345 (N.Y. App. Div. 1998) (Rosenber-
ger, J.P., dissenting).
91. These cases include efforts by surviving same-sex partners to be considered spouses under the
law of intestate succession, Matter of Cooper, 592 N.Y.S.2d 797 (N.Y. App. Div. 1993), as well as a
case in which the Crime Victims Board decided that same-sex partners were not surviving spouses to be
compensated under the relevant law. Secord v. Fischetti, 653 N.Y.S.2d 551 (N.Y. App. Div. 1997).
Although in the first set of cases, same-sex and opposite-sex couples are not identically situated, at least
the same-sex partners can provide for each other by will, thereby avoiding the intestacy problem. As to
Secord, Judge Rosenberger noted that surviving same-sex partners were able to recover under a differ-
ent section of the statute, which paid damages to "any other person dependent for his principal support
upon a victim of a crime." Raum, 675 N.Y.S.2d at 346 (Rosenberger, J.P., dissenting). The lack of
alternative protection provided by the wrongful death statute seems to have been the linchpin of Judge
Rosenberger's argument.
92. Raum, 675 N.Y.S.2d at 346 (Rosenberger, J.P., dissenting).
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was to be expected that battles over marriage equality would be the most
seriously waged. As the next section demonstrated, this struggle is hardly
over.
IV. THE "AUGHTS:" STAGGERING TOWARDS EQUALITY?
On December 20, 1999, the Vermont Supreme Court welcomed the
new millennium through its decision in Baker v. State of Vermont.93 Al-
though it could not have been known at the time, the carefully constructed
compromise at the core of the court's holding has come to represent the
place where a majority of Americans find themselves today on the issue of
gay relationships: in favor of formal equality-most often represented by
the newly minted "civil union" status that arose from Baker-but against
outright marriage equality. In this final section, I describe the evolving
perception of gays and lesbians through the familiar triad of marriage, tort,
and private ordering, and conclude that the ever-increasing social accep-
tance of gay people, lives and families will eventually lead to legal equality
in all realms. But marriage will likely be difficult for at least a generation to
come.
A. Marriage Equality: Preliminaries
In Baker, the court held that denying the benefits of marriage to same-
sex couples violated the state's constitutional promise of "common bene-
fits" (read: equal rights) for all "Vermonters." The court, however, declined
to require the state to extend the right of marriage to these couples, instead
leaving the state free to devise a parallel institution for same-sex couples
that would grant all of the rights of marriage without bestowing the status
of marriage. Elsewhere, I have argued that the court should have taken the
final step and ordered full marriage equality, 94 but events have shown that
the decision, while legally impeachable, was politically astute.95 Yet the
decision is also notable for the court's soaring peroration, which recognized
and welcomed gay and lesbian relationships into the human family: "The
extension of the Common Benefits Clause to acknowledge plaintiffs as
Vermonters who seek nothing more, nor less, than legal protection and
93. 744 A.2d 864 (Vt. 1999).
94. "[T]he majority should have discharged its responsibility to provide the ... remedy sought.
Instead, what remains is the shell of legal discrimination against same-sex couples, who have to settle
for something not-quite-marriage." John G. Culhane, A Tale of Two Concurrences: Same-Sex Marriage
and Products Liability, 7 WM. & MARY J. WOMEN & L. 447,471 (2001).
95. As the local Vermont journalist David Moats has chronicled in his excellent book, CIVIL
WARS (2004), it was difficult enough to enact the civil union law.
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security for their avowed commitment to an intimate and lasting human
relationship is simply, when all is said and done, a recognition of our com-
mon humanity." 96
In so stating, the court moved in step with the reality of increasing
presence and acceptance of gays and lesbians in the United States. Data and
anecdote alike bear witness to this phenomenon, which is likely in accor-
dance with the intuition of most readers of this article. As to data: In the
years between 2000 and 2005, the number of same-sex couple households
increased by about 30% (from 600,000 to 777,000)97 obviously this num-
ber includes only self-identifying gays and lesbians in relationships stable
enough to call themselves "households." Further, gay and lesbian parents
are increasingly raising children.98
Translating this statistical profile to recognition of the reality of gay
lives is not difficult, and can be found in all sorts of places. For example,
U.S. Supreme Court Justice Sandra Day O'Connor voted with a majority of
justices in the 1987 case of Bowers v. Hardwick, a decision holding that
states could constitutionally prohibit intimate, private conduct between
members of the same-sex. By 2003, however, she voted with a majority in
Lawrence v. Texas in its decision that overruled Bowers, writing a concur-
rence stating that principles of equality forbade the states from this kind of
disparate and disparaging treatment. While it is true that the concurrence
allowed Justice O'Connor to avoid directly contradicting her earlier posi-
tion, the evolution in her view seems obvious. At least one observer has
attributed this change to the new perception Justice O'Connor gained from
having openly gay law clerks, at least one of whom was raising a child.99
Of greater practical significance, the majority opinion in Lawrence
evinces this emerging recognition that gay lives are real and to be valued
and respected. Justice Anthony Kennedy's language went far beyond what
was needful to the task of overruling Bowers, as bad a piece of Supreme
96. Baker, 744 A.2d at 889.
97. See Ryan Lee, A TL Ranks Third Among Cities With Highest Percentage of Gay Residents,
WILLIAMS INSTITUTE, Nov. 17, 2006, http://www.law.ucla.edu/williamsinstitute/press/ATLRanks
Third.html (using data from 2000 and 2005 census reports).
98. See SEARS & BADGETT, supra note 52 (analyzing census data from 2000 and stating that as of
that date there were 90,000 same-sex couples in California and that about 70,000 children were being
raised in households headed by same-sex partners).
99. ESKRIDGE, JR., supra note 63, at 325 (stating that: "More than her colleagues, she had had her
eyes opened by former law clerks who had come out as homosexual; at least one was raising a child.").
This point is elaborated on in another book, where the author describes how Justice O'Connor extended
her practice of giving tee-shirts to the newborns of her former law clerks to include a gay former clerk
who had just adopted a baby: "O'Connor poked her head into her current clerks' office, explained the
situation, and said, 'I should send one of the shirts, right? We think this is a good idea, don't we?' The
clerks nodded, and the shirt went in the mail." JEFFREY TOOBIN, THE NINE 187 (2007).
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Court logic and craft as one can find. For Justice Kennedy, gay people, like
all other citizens were "entitled to respect for their private lives."'100 Fur-
ther, "[t]he State cannot demean their existence or control their destiny by
making their private sexual conduct a crime." 101
For all of its affirming language and sympathetic tone, though, Law-
rence also reiterates-via needless dictum-that the case is not about mar-
riage. Again, Justice Kennedy: "The present case... does not involve
whether the government must give formal recognition to any relationship
that homosexual persons seek to enter. ' 102 Justice O'Connor's concurrence
was far more explicit on the marriage issue, and, typically for her, mirrored
the prevailing view that rights relating to private sexual intimacies were
less problematic than of marriage: "Unlike the moral disapproval of same-
sex relations.., other reasons exist to promote the institution of marriage
beyond mere moral disapproval of an excluded group. ' 103
Justice O'Connor's evolving position on issues relating to gay rights
can be seen in many arenas today, ranging from judicial decisions on same-
sex marriage, to legislation and popular initiatives on the issue, to tort and
private law. The remainder of this Article briefly discusses these three ar-
eas.
B. Marriage Equality:Courts Break Through, Legislatures Lock Down
With Baker as immediate background, several state appellate courts
have confronted the marriage equality issue during the present decade.
Many articles have been written analyzing and dissecting these opinions,
and I shall mostly refrain from doing so here. Instead, the cases are dis-
cussed in furtherance of this Article's project of chronicling the halting but
clear substantive and rhetorical progress of the GLBT movement towards
real, and deeply understood, equality.
The cases and judicial views may fairly be grouped into four catego-
ries: cases and judges that support full marriage equality; one case that
follows the Baker "virtual equality" approach; cases and judges that deny
marriage equality but are clearly sympathetic to the unfairness and diffi-
culty that their decisions and the underlying legal system impose on gay
couples; and cases and judges that matter-of-factly (and occasionally nas-
100. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 578.
101. Id.
102. Id. Elsewhere, Justice Kennedy states that the statutes in question "seek to control a personal
relationship that, whether or not entitled to formal recognition in the law, is within the liberty of persons
to choose..." Id. at 558.
103. Id. at 585 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
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tily) reject the equality claim. This spectrum, of course, reflects the band-
width of public opinion on the issue, but focusing on the language used by
courts serves to articulate the underlying sentiment that often wants for
clear expression. It will best suit my purposes to work from the least sym-
pathetic views to the most.
It is striking that even the decisions and judicial pronouncements that
give no comfort to gay couples generally refrain from the kind of border-
line hostile rhetoric that sometimes marked judges' views not so long ago.
"Generally" is the operative word, because at least one opinion does dem-
onstrate a thinly masked hostility. In his concurring opinion in Andersen v.
King County,104 Justice James M. Johnson made little effort to disguise his
lack of sympathy for the plaintiffs' position. Joined by Justice Sanders, he
was sure to expressly disagree with the plurality opinion's view that the
case was "difficult."' 105 The concurring opinion also sympathetically and
uncritically cited studies purporting to show that children did best in stable
two-parent families, barely acknowledging that these studies did not in-
volve a side-by-side comparison of opposite-sex and same-sex couples. 106
Most tellingly, the opinion adopts the grammatical tactic favored by the
most vocal opponents of marriage equality: placing ironic quotation marks
around the word "marriage", thus: same-sex "marriage."' 107
More typically, decisions and opinions rejecting marriage equality
claims avoid this kind of provocative approach. In Standhardt v. Superior
Court,10 8 an Arizona appellate court followed a standard, "matter of fact"
approach-not hostile, but not sympathetic to the real-world effect of deny-
ing marriage equality on the gay community. One measure of the court's
approach comes at the beginning: The Standhardt court did not provide any
description of the relationship of the couple challenging Arizona's anti-
marriage equality law. As we shall see, more sympathetic courts routinely
adopt the petitioning parties' descriptions of their lives and highlight them
in their opinions. As for legal analysis, Standhardt mostly evinces a clinical
detachment from reality: defining the "fundamental right" to marry as lim-
ited to opposite-sex marriage; declining to recognize sexual orientation as a
suspect class for purposes of equal protection analysis; and then using the
highly deferential rational basis test to conclude that the legislature might
104. 138 P.3d 963 (Wash. 2006).
105. Id. at 991 (Johnson, J., concurring in judgment only).
106. Id. at 1002.
107. Id. at 993. For a good example of a commentator employing this tactic, see Robert P. George,
What's Sex Got to Do with It?: Marriage, Morality, and Rationality, 49 AM. J. JURIS. 63, 81, nn.62-63
(2004).
108. 77 P.3d 451 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2003).
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have believed that restricting marriage rights to the only couples capable of
unassisted biological reproduction was justified. Because same-sex couples
cannot do so, the court went on, "the State could also reasonably decide
that sanctioning same-sex marriage would do little to advance the State's
interest in ensuring responsible procreation within committed, long-term
relationships."' 09
Critics of this argument abound (I am one of them), 10 but my purpose
here is not to substantively criticize arguments, but to explore their rela-
tionship to a court's underlying view about gay couples. Of course, courts
can disguise or suppress these views behind a veil of "neutral" legal analy-
sis, but critical legal scholars long ago lifted that veil to expose the assump-
tions underlying decisional law. The Standhardt court was particularly
adept at maintaining this illusion of obeisance to constitutional commands;
it recognized that that the exclusion of same-sex couples from the institu-
tion of marriage "may result in some inequity for children raised by same-
sex couples,"'' 1 but purported to be unable to do anything about the injus-
tice it had just identified: After all, this is rational basis analysis! This clini-
cal understatement reflects a level of detachment from the reality of life for
children (and for their parents, inequity to whom is not even acknowl-
edged).
While Standhardt identified the problem but did not empathize, the
plurality opinion in Andersen v. King County went a step further. Signifi-
cantly, the Andersen plurality did not discuss the lives of the nineteen cou-
ples who had challenged the law. Yet, after a long decision that largely
tracks the standard constitutional justifications for excluding same-sex
couples from marriage, the court did more than acknowledge that its denial
of marriage equality might "result in some inequity," it spelled out the
problem rather sympathetically:
[M]any day-to-day decisions that are routine for married couples are
more complex, more agonizing, and more costly for same-sex couples,
unlike married couples who automatically have the advantages and rights
provided to them in... laws and policies such as those surrounding
medical conditions ... probate ... and health insurance. 12
Then, the court went a step further, inviting the legislature to remedy the
inequity it had just identified: "[G]iven the clear hardship faced by same-
sex couples evidenced in this lawsuit, the legislature may want to reexam-
109. Id. at 463.
110. John G. Culhane, Beyond Rights and Morality: The Overlooked Public Health Argument for
Same-Sex Marriage, 17 L. & SEXUALITY REV. 7, 19 (2008).
111. Standhardt, 77 P.3d at 463.
112. Andersen, 138 P.3d at 990.
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ine the impact of the marriage laws on all citizens of this state."' 13 In so
stating, the court might also have been telegraphing its view on the argu-
ment that, even if same-sex couples are not entitled to "marriage," they
might have a case for the rights and obligations incident to marriage; but
the court went on to note that the parties had expressly requested that the
court not consider this alternative approach. 114
That approach, which might be called the "virtual equality" line of de-
cisional and legislative law, reflects a view that generally recognizes the
inequity of denying same-sex couples the benefits of marriage, but attempts
to strike the political (and sometimes judicial) compromise enabled by
Baker.
Perhaps the Andersen court was also inviting future plaintiffs to seek
the benefits of marriage without the label. If so, it veered close to the ap-
proach pioneered in Baker and most recently followed by the New Jersey
Supreme Court in Lewis v. Harris.115 The Lewis court came as close as
possible to mandating the issuance of marriage licenses to same-sex cou-
ples: four of seven justices left open the "civil union" option (which the
legislature subsequently grasped for), while the three dissenters would have
required full marriage equality, including the title. 116 Thus, all seven judges
supported at least formal equality. Moreover, the majority decision is
overtly empathetic to the seven couples before them, devoting an entire
subsection of the opinion to a description of their lives, and summarizing
the discussion with this stark statement: "The seeming ordinariness of
plaintiffs' lives is belied by the social indignities and economic difficulties
that they daily face due to the inferior legal standing of their relationship
compared to that of married couples." 117 That the court nonetheless
stopped short of mandating full marriage equality seemed to stem from its
optimism that events in New Jersey were moving inexorably in the plain-
tiffs' direction-"we must steer clear of the swift and treacherous currents
of social policy"' 8-and that further discussion should be through the
"democratic process. Although courts can ensure equal treatment, they
cannot guarantee social acceptance, which must come through the evolving
113. Id. Shortly before this article went to press, the Washington legislature took the court's sug-
gestion, enacting a comprehensive domestic partnership statute. See Chris Grygiel, Lawmakers Pass
Expanded Domestic Partner Rights, SEATTLEPI.COM, Apr. 16, 2009, http://www.seattlepi.com/local/
405189_domestic I 6.html.
114. Id.
115. Lewis v. Harris, 908 A.2d 196 (N.J. 2006).
116. Id. at220-21.
117. Id. at 202.
118. Id. at 222.
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ethos of a maturing society."' 19
Issuing a moving dissent on her final day on the bench, Chief Judge
Deborah Poritz understood even more fully the complexity of the equality
problem, and made that understanding evident in an unusual way: by quot-
ing at length from the affidavits submitted by one of the couples attesting to
the real, human cost of their exclusion from the intangible benefits con-
ferred by their inability to speak the word "marriage" in describing their
lives. Because Justice Poritz took the unusual step of incorporating these
attestations into her opinion, it is worth quoting one of them at length:
I've seen that there is a significant respect that comes with the declara-
tion "[w]e're married." Society endows the institution of marriage with
not only a host of rights and responsibilities, but with a significant re-
spect for the relationship of the married couple. When you say that you
are married, others know immediately that you have taken steps to create
something special... The word "married" gives you automatic member-
ship in a vast club of people whose values are clarified by their choice of
marriage. With a marriage, everyone can instantly relate to you and your
relationship. They don't have to wonder what kind of relationship it is or
how to refer to it or how much to respect it.120
The final step, of course, is marriage equality. Beginning with the
groundbreaking decision by the Massachusetts Supreme Court in Good-
ridge v. Department of Public Health, as of this writing four state supreme
courts (California, Connecticut, and Iowa as well as Massachusetts) have
mandated the issuance of marriage licenses for same-sex couples, thereby
implicitly (in the case of Massachusetts) or explicitly (in the other states)
rejecting the argument that other, recently created institutions (the civil
union or the domestic partnership) are the equal of marriage. 12 1
119. Id.at223.
120. Id. at 226 (Poritz, C.J., dissenting).
121. In Massachusetts, the challenge to the prohibition against same-sex marriage was brought
against a backdrop of no state recognition of anything like marriage for gay couples. Therefore, when
the court held that "barring an individual from the protections, benefits, and obligations of civil mar-
riage solely because that person would marry a person of the same sex violates the Massachusetts
Constitution[,]" Goodridge v. Dep't of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941, 969 (Mass. 2003), there ensued
some discussion among commentators and the state legislature as to whether the court might counte-
nance creation of a parallel institution that conferred the "protections, benefits and obligations" of
marriage, without the label. The Massachusetts Senate therefore submitted to the Justices of the Su-
preme Judicial Court a bill that established civil unions while prohibiting same-sex couples from marry-
ing, and requested an opinion from the justices as to whether such a bill, if ultimately enacted, would
satisfy the court's directive. Opinion of the Justices to the Senate, 802 N.E.2d 565, 566 (Mass. 2004).
The court's rejection of this effort could not have been clearer, and presages the treatment of the issue
by the California and Connecticut Supreme Courts:
Because the proposed law by its express terms forbids same-sex couples entry into civil
marriage, it continues to relegate same-sex couples to a different status.... If... the
proponents of the bill believe that no message is conveyed by eschewing the word 'marriage'
and replacing it with 'civil union' . .. we doubt that the attempt to circumvent the court's
decision in Goodridge would be so purposeful.
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Two features of these decisions bear discussion for present purposes.
First, anyone furnished with the facts as stated by courts considering the
marriage equality issue would stand an excellent chance of predicting the
legal outcome. Those courts that have rejected the claims have generally
avoided discussion of the lives of the couples before them, while courts
(and judges in dissent) favoring marriage equality have described these
lives with the richness of empathy. Compare, for example, Chief Justice
Judith Kaye's summarizing discussion of the plaintiffs' lives in her dissent-
ing opinion in Hernandez v. Robles, 122 with the absence of any such men-
tion in the majority opinion denying marriage equality (or even civil
unions). In her words: "Plaintiffs... include a doctor, a police officer, a
public school teacher, a nurse, an artist and a State legislator. Ranging in
age from under 30 to 68, plaintiffs reflect a diversity of races, religions, and
ethnicities."'123 Chief Judge Kaye then went on to cite the couples' geo-
graphical diversity, long-term commitments, parenting obligations, and
community involvement, and concluded: "In short, plaintiffs represent a
cross-section of New Yorkers who want only to live full lives, raise their
children, better their communities and be good neighbors."'124 These de-
scriptions foregrounded the empathetic statement that followed, in which
Chief Judge Kaye gathered herself and all New Yorkers into a warm com-
munity, but one that unfairly excluded gay couples:
For most of us, leading a full life includes establishing a family. Indeed,
most New Yorkers can look back on, or forward to, their wedding as
among the most significant events of their lives. They, like plaintiffs,
grew up hoping to find that one person with whom they would share
their future, eager to express their mutual lifetime pledge through civil
marriage. [But] plaintiffs are denied [these] rights and responsibilities.
This State has a proud tradition of affording equal rights to all New
Yorkers. Sadly, the Court today retreats from that proud tradition. 125
Similarly, in the four state supreme court decisions requiring marriage
equality-in Massachusetts, California, and Connecticut-the courts begin
with an often detailed account of the couples' lives, making clear before the
legal analysis is even underway that the marriage laws adversely affect
people whose lives look very much like the lives of opposite-sex couples.
In contrast, courts findingno unconstitutional deprivation in the denial of
marriage rights to same-sex couples offer only the bare facts needed to
situate the legal issue. Prototypical of this approach is Andersen v. King
Id. at 569-70.
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County,12 6 which offered the cold but legally sufficient statement that "six-
teen individuals, eight couples, sought marriage licenses... Their requests
were denied because each sought to marry someone of the same sex." 127
This sterile approach likely makes easier the conclusion that no constitu-
tional rights are infringed by denying marriage equality, and, in an impor-
tant way, hearkens back to the days of the closet-except that in this case
only one side agrees to the "bargain." The second notable feature of the
marriage equality decisions is, as the name "marriage equality" implies, the
strong and emerging focus on real, as opposed to formal, equality. This
focus relates to the courts' discussions of the couples' lives and the very
real deprivations that second-class status (which civil unions are recognized
to confer) works on people. The remarks that follow focus on the California
Supreme Court's decision in In re Marriage Cases, but let us first situate
the case among the three marriage equality cases.
Goodridge differs fundamentally from In re Marriage Cases and Ker-
rigan, in that the Massachusetts court mandated marriage equality in a state
that did not already have a "virtual equivalent" (namely the civil union). 128
The court's analysis consciously fused "fundamental rights" and "equality"
jurisprudence, utilizing standard analytical and doctrinal tools to reach a
progressive result. Further, the court side-stepped the issue of whether the
case required strict scrutiny, holding that the legislature lacked even a ra-
tional basis for denying marriage licenses to same-sex couples.
In California and Connecticut, by contrast, the legislatures had already
established the domestic partnership and the civil union, respectively,
which granted all of the rights and obligations of marriage but pointedly
not the label. 129 Thus, these courts were left with the (in a sense) narrow
question whether the couples before them were suffering a cognizable in-
jury when the benefits that the state could officially confer were equal be-
tween same-sex and opposite-sex couples. Only a court that truly
understands that the resulting regime nonetheless imposes a real cost on the
couples subject to this "pure" discrimination can furnish the relief of true
equality.
Both courts did so in a startling way: The California Supreme Court
126. 138 P.3d at 963.
127. Id. at970.
128. This was also true of Varnum v. Brien, 763 N.W.2d 862 (Iowa 2009). Because Varnum was
handed down just as this article was going to press, its results are summarized but not analyzed herein.
129. While the term civil union has been adopted only in states that wish to confer all of the bene-
fits of marriage without the label, "domestic partnership" is ambiguous. In California and Oregon, it
does what the civil union does; in other states and localities, it confers only some subset of marriage's




became the first high court in any state to declare that sexual orientation is
a suspect classification, thereby triggering strict scrutiny and practically
ordaining the conclusion that the challenged law fails. 130 The very recent
decisions by the Connecticut (and also the Iowa) Supreme Courts take the
perhaps even more unusual position that sexual orientation is a "quasi-
suspect" classification, thereby calling for intermediate scrutiny. 131 Sexual
orientation was not included in a provision of the Connecticut state consti-
tution that listed impermissible categories for discrimination, 132 but the
court expressly denied that it was using the lower standard for that reason.
Nonetheless, it is not unreasonable to assume that the provision made the
judges more comfortable with using a slightly lower standard; especially
since that standard easily led to the same result. Although both decisions
are of signal importance, the California decision is perhaps the better vehi-
cle for analysis here, given the court's complex and thoughtful fusion of the
jurisprudence-and reality-of fundamental rights and equality.
In re Marriage Cases, although lengthy, is worthwhile reading for
proponents and opponents of marriage equality, 133 but also has the kind of
aspirational tone likely to sway many undecided citizens. Pushing off from
the starting premise that gays and lesbians are entitled to the same dignity
and respect as everyone else, the court swept aside the argument that the
fundamental right to marry was defined by or limited to opposite-sex cou-
ples. Like everyone else, gay couples-whose lives had already been de-
scribed by the court-have an interest in marrying a person of their choice,
not an abstract interest in the right to marriage as historically defined. The
court then launched an exhaustive discussion of the rights, obligations, and
responsibilities of marriage. This discussion included a catalogue of the
remaining differences between marriage and California's very expansive
domestic partnership status, 134 but the court relegated these distinctions to a
footnote, and in any case did not appear to attach great emphasis to these
relatively minor inequalities. Instead, Chief Judge George's majority opin-
ion is an alembic through which the long-smoldering hopes of gay and
130. Id. at441-42.
131. Kerrigan v. Comm'r of Pub. Health, 957 A.2d 407, 432-33 (Conn. 2008); Vamrnum v. Brien,
763 N.W.2d 862, 888-93 (Iowa 2009).
132. Id. at422.
133. As stated earlier, the effect of the court's decision is unclear as of this writing because of the
passage of Proposition 8, which purports to amend the state's constitution to strip same-sex couples of
marriage equality. See McKinley & Goodstein, supra note 9. Nonetheless, the decision is analyzed here
because: (1) it is likely to retain effect for those couples who did marry during the several months of
2008 between the decision and the passage of Proposition 8; (2) there is some chance that the initiative
will be struck down as improperly passed; and (3) the decision is sound and ground-breaking on its own
merits, regardless of subsequent actions that may or may not nullify its impact.
134. In re Marriage Cases, 183 P.3d at 416 n.24.
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lesbian couples are given rhetorical strength and vital legal approbation:
Even when the state affords substantive legal rights and benefits to a
couple's family relationship that are comparable to the rights and bene-
fits afforded to other couples, the state's assignment of a different name
to the couple's relationship poses a risk that the different name itself will
have the effect of denying such couple's relationship the equal respect
and dignity to which the couple is constitutionally entitled. Plaintiffs
contend that.., the current California statutes properly must be under-
stood as having just such a constitutionally suspect effect.
We agree with plaintiffs' contention. .. [A]ffording same-sex couples
access only to the separate institution of domestic partnership, and deny-
ing such couples access to the established institution of marriage, prop-
erly must be viewed as impinging upon the right of those couples to have
their family relationship accorded respect and dignity equal to that ac-
corded the family relationship of opposite-sex couples.135
Thus, the judiciary has begun to clear a path towards marriage equal-
ity, and has done so with decisions that welcome gay couples into the legal
and social community, effectively welding law to rhetoric.
As noted in the earlier discussion of the DOMA, however, matters in
state and federal legislatures have been quite different. For a start, only one
state legislature (California) has voted for same-sex marriages-and even
this effort did not survive a veto by the governor. 136 A few other states
have enacted "virtual marriage" laws-either civil unions or the full-rights
version of domestic partnership, 137 while far more states have moved to-
wards statutory or constitutional prohibition against same-sex marriages. 138
Given the diversity of views represented throughout the nation and the
135. Id. at 444-45.
136. See supra notes 5, 129, 134 and accompanying text. The legislation likely would not have
survived judicial scrutiny in any case; in In re Marriage Cases, the court discussed § 308.5 of the
Family Code, adopted by the California voters by initiative in 2000. That statute limits marriage to the
union of one man and one woman. Because it was passed through the initiative process, the court stated
that the legislature could not overturn it without first submitting it to the voters. In re Marriage Cases,
183 P.3d at 410-13.
137. As of this writing, New Jersey, New Hampshire and Vermont have civil union laws, while
Oregon has a domestic partnership scheme that confers substantially the same rights as marriage. See In
re Marriage Cases, 183 P.3d at 398 n.2, for a then-current account of the different laws affording same-
sex couples state-wide relationship recognition. Since the court's decision, however, Connecticut now
permits same-sex marriages (as required by Kerrigan v. Comm'r of Public Health, 957 A.2d 407 (Conn.
2008)), and the status of California's marriage law is in doubt; if Proposition 8 is ultimately upheld, the
state will revert to its domestic partnership law, which attempts to grant all of marriage's benefits to
same-sex couples. But see In re Marriage Cases, 183 P.3d at 416 n.24 (setting forth a number of re-
maining differences between the two statuses).
138. The number of states doing so is a moving target, as they continue to fortify the ramparts by
enshrining the anti-equality laws into their constitutions, expand the prohibition to include "marriage
equivalents" (using various terms, some of which have already led to difficult questions of interpreta-
tion), or, in some cases, move in the other direction by recognizing marriage or "similar" rights. Among
the websites attempting to keep up-to-date on these developments, a usually reliable one is Human
Rights Campaign, http://www.hrc.org/issues/marriage.as (last visited Nov. 14, 2008).
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political spectrum, perhaps the most accurate gauge of public sentiment as
expressed through elected officials can be found in the discussions about
the proposed Federal Marriage Amendment (FMA), which reads as fol-
lows:
Marriage in the United States shall consist solely of the union of a man
and a woman. Neither this Constitution, nor the constitution of any State,
shall be construed to require that marriage or the legal incidents thereof
be conferred upon any union other than the union of a man and a
woman. 139
This amendment, which stands little chance of passing, would seem-
ingly allow civil unions or any other marriage equivalent, but only if passed
by state legislatures, not if thought required by federal or constitutional
law. It would clearly ban same-sex marriages. Yet a sample of statements
made in 2006 by Senators and Representatives indicates, albeit with excep-
tions, that the presence of gay and lesbian people is now taken as a given,
and has been to an extent "normalized." Thus, an optimist reading into the
anti-gay-marriage statements might see the development of a view that
could one day evolve into a vote for equality.
In his eloquent remarks in opposition to the FMA, Vermont Senator
Patrick Leahy quoted favorably from President George W. Bush's state-
ment "real lives will be affected by our debates and decisions,
and ... every human being has dignity and value... "140 Admittedly, these
remarks were taken out of context; Mr. Bush was talking about the equally
sensitive and polarizing issue of immigration law reform. But the recent
debates over the FMA reveal, by and large, an increased respect for gay
couples, and a newly defensive posture on the part of those supporting
amending the process. Indeed, demonizing comments by elected officials
(at least at the federal level) are by now so rare that one is struck when they
do surface, as here by Senator Inhofe of Oklahoma: "The homosexual mar-
riage lobby. .. [has] the goal of... breaking down all State-regulated mar-
riage requirements to just one: consent. In doing so, they are paving the
way for legal protection of such repugnant practices as: homosexual mar-
riage, unrestricted sexual conduct between adults and children, group mar-
riage, incest, and bestiality.' ' 141
Tellingly, none of the other representatives or senators who argued
in favor of the FMA echoed Sen. Inhofe's approach, likely for fear of being
associated with such retrograde views. Instead, the remarks in support of
the FMA tended to cluster around a few loosely related ideas: marriage is
139. S.J. Res. 1, 109th Cong. (2005).
140. 152 CONG. REC. S5407 (daily ed. June 5, 2006) (statement of Sen. Leahy).
141. 152 CONG. REC. S5450 (daily ed. June 6, 2006) (statement of Sen. Inhofe).
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under attack (not only or even from gay couples), and its definition is there-
fore in need of affirmation; children would be adversely affected by allow-
ing same-sex couples to marry; "rogue" judges are thwarting the will of the
people, as expressed through state law, to define marriage as they wish; and
states should have the freedom to grant some or (perhaps) even most or all
of the rights of marriage through such institutions as the civil union or do-
mestic partnership, but only if so decreed by the legislature-not by courts.
In making their arguments, the pro-FMA forces relied on a combination of
tautological assertions about the meaning of marriage and a results-driven
interpretation of social science data. What they notably did not rely on was
negative comments about gay families-some of whom, after all, would be
visible constituents in even the "reddest" of states. A brief sampling of a
few of these comments, which often mix some of the assertions set forth
above, will suffice to illustrate the point.
The comments of Senator Vitter from Louisiana are typical. He criti-
cizes the "rush" by "activist courts" to "radically redefine" marriage, 142 and
then states the social science view that the best results for children are
gained in a "loving, nurturing, two-parent family... ",143 He then makes
the move that often follows, noting that this two-parent family consists of
"a mother and a father." 144 Similarly, Senator Orrin Hatch of Utah sounded
the theme of "a few elite judges" improperly deciding social policy, but
then added that "respectful" treatment must be afforded "homosexual citi-
zens" who "are endowed with the rights that Thomas Jefferson elaborated
in the Declaration of Independence." But apparently marriage equality is
not a right; it is "social policy" that is properly decided by "the people,"
"not judges. ' 14 5
Perhaps most articulate in defending traditional marriage was Senator
Sam Brownback of Kansas. 146 After calling for civility, Sen. Brownback
referred extensively to data from European countries that have, over the
142. Id. at S5456 (statement of Sen. Vitter).
143. Id.
144. Id. While there is (contested) social science research supporting the view that children do best
in stable, married households, the studies purportedly so demonstrating compared single families, and
in some cases families with cohabiting opposite-sex parents, to two-parent, married households. Same-
sex parents raising children have not been part of these studies. In fact, the emerging research suggests
that children do just as well in households headed by same-sex parents as by opposite-sex parents. See,
e.g., William Meezan & Jonathan Rauch, Gay Marriage, Same-Sex Parenting, and America's Children,
FUTURE OF CHILDREN, Fall 2005, at 97, 102-04, available at http://www.princeton.edu/ futureofchil-
dren/publications/docs/1 5_02_FullJoumal.pdf.; Charlotte J. Patterson, Family Relationships of Lesbians
and Gay Men, 62 J. MARRIAGE & FAM. 1053, 1058-60. Such studies are typically ignored or dispar-
aged as insufficiently well-grounded by those opposing marriage equality.
145. 152 CONG. REc. S5457-58 (daily ed. June 6, 2006) (statement of Sen. Hatch).
146. 152 CONG. REc. S5419-24 (daily ed. June 5, 2006) (statement of Sen. Brownback).
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past two decades, moved towards recognition of same-sex partnerships. 147
In at least some of these countries, he noted, out-of-wedlock births have
increased. 148 In his view, this evidence suggests that granting marriage
rights to same-sex couples could destabilize the institution by redefining
it.149 The evidence to which Sen. Brownback refers does not in fact support
the causal connection he believes it does, 150 but what is interesting in the
context of the present discussion is that those most seriously backing the
FMA recognize that it is no longer sufficient simply to dismiss the claim
for marriage equality, and, by extension, the lives of same-sex couples,
through demonization and circular reasoning about a presumed immutable
definition of marriage. Evidence of the effect of marriage equality (how-
ever weak, in my view) was needed, and respect was required: "I am just
saying that we have basic social data on this vast social experiment ... I
respect my colleagues who have a different position. There are good people
on all sides of this issue. But the data is what it is."1 51
Indeed, the FMA supporters, despite their significant numbers and the
strength of their convictions, have often seemed on the defensive, fending
off charges of bigotry and discrimination. For example, in the 2004 House
debate, Representative Hayworth of Arizona supported the amendment but
protested that he was not discriminating against gay people: "Marriage is
not about excluding a group of people. Marriage is about what is best for
our children and our society. ' 152 Expanding on this comment, he added:
"Marriage is not about exclusion. It is about inclusion and an inclusive
foundation for children and society... Marriage encourages the men and
women who together create life to unite in a bond for the protection of
children. That is not discrimination."' 153
It is unsurprising that in the House of Representatives, even more so
than in the generally more genteel Senate, members were mostly careful to
avoid openly offending the GLBT community; the House, after all has two
openly gay members who were present and who participated in the debates.
The point is made clear in the comments of the extremely conservative
Rep. Tom Delay of Texas to Rep. Barney Frank of Massachusetts: "I have
147. Id. at S5419 (statement of Sen. Brownback).
148. Id. at S5420 (statement of Sen. Brownback).
149. Id.
150. Extensive treatment of this debate is well beyond my purposes here. Much of the data on
which Sen. Brownback relied is discussed and its interpretation refuted in WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR. &
DARREN R. SPEDALE, GAY MARRIAGE: FOR BETTER OR WORSE? (2006).
151. 152 CONG. REc. S5420 (daily ed. June 5, 2006) (statement of Sen. Brownback).
152. 150 CONG. REC. H7900-01 (daily ed. Sept. 30, 2004) (statement of Sen. Hayworth).
153. Id.
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utmost respect for the gentleman from Massachusetts. I respect his feelings.
No one is attacking his feelings or his relationships. There are many loving
relationships between adults."' 154 Predictably, Delay then went on to dis-
cuss the importance of "traditional" marriage between "one man and one
woman" raising their children. But Delay's respectful tone towards Rep.
Frank suggests that GLBT Americans are part of the national discourse, no
longer able to be dismissed with the kind of nasty epithet employed by
Delay's predecessor as House Majority Leader, Dick Armey: In 1995, Ar-
mey had referred to Rep. Frank as "Barney Fag."'155
Similarly, it would be hard to speak disrespectfully in response to the
measured comments of Tammy Baldwin, an openly lesbian Representative
from Wisconsin. Rep. Baldwin noted that the Constitution had never been
amended to deny rights. She went on:
This debate is not simply ... theoretical ... It has a real impact on mil-
lions of Amreicans. I believe that the institution of marriage enhances
our social fabric in many positive ways. I think we all agree that loving,
supportive marriages provide strong environments for raising chil-
dren. 156
After noting that children in two-parent families did better on average
than kids only able to rely on one parent, she continued:
Marriage's role in protecting children is about providing sustenance. It is
about teaching. It is about sharing cultures and beliefs. It is about trans-
mitting a family's values. It is about providing love and emotional sup-
port. These are all important components of marriage, and none of them
are exclusive to a couple consisting of a man and a woman. 157
In short, at least at the national level speaking ill of the gay commu-
nity has, at last, mostly fallen out of favor. At least, homophobic statements
and views have largely been moved into a closet down the hall from the
one formerly occupied by gay persons themselves. 158 Such is the natural
outgrowth of increased gay visibility and-to a greater or lesser extent-
acceptance.
154. Id. at H7908 (statement of Sen. Delay).
155. Frank Rich, Journal; Closet Clout, N.Y. TIMEs, Feb. 2, 1995, at A23, available at
http://query.nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.html?res=990CE6DF 113AF93 IA3575 1 COA963958260.
156. 150 CONG. REc. H7901 (daily ed. Sept. 30, 2004) (statement of Rep. Baldwin).
157. Id.
158. Occasionally, someone records what happens in such closets. Consider the recent case of an
Oklahoma state legislator who claimed that homosexuality posed a greater threat to the Republic than
terrorism. Associated Press, Oklahoma Rep. Sally Kern on YouTube Clip: Homosexuality Bigger Threat
Than Terrorism, Fox NEWS, Mar. 16, 2008, http://www.foxnews.com/story/0,2933,338271,00.html.
Would she have spoken thus had she expected her comments would have been recorded and then
repeated? Likely not.
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C. Final Thoughts on Developments in Tort and Private Ordering
As noted throughout this Article, the developments in relationship
recognition tend to move in similar, sometimes stronger, ways when the
consideration moves from the volatile marriage issue, with its attendant
cultural, religious and social associations. In tort law, courts have increas-
ingly come to grips with the upheavals created by increasing recognition of
same-sex relationships. Of greatest significance, of course, are statutes that
incidentally grant tort rights to members of same-sex couples who register
under the state's laws granting relationship recognition to domestic partner-
ships, civil unions, or, of course, marriage itself.159 But even absent such
statutes, the emerging recognition of gay lives-and deaths-has begun to
make inroads, too. A few recent wrongful death cases well illustrate the
point, but also show the need for full, clear equality.
Long before In Re Marriage Cases, California law had been moving
steadily in favor of same-sex partnerships. In 2001, the wrongful death
statute was amended to add domestic partners to the list of eligible benefi-
ciaries. As is sometimes the case, this amendment was passed in response
to political pressure created by an incident that gathered a great deal of
attention.
Earlier that year, Diane Whipple had been mauled to death by a dog;
the underlying circumstances of pet owner misconduct were so serious that
the dog's owners faced criminal charges. 160 Under the wrongful death law
159. Civil union laws and "full dress" domestic partnership laws purport to equal marriage, so they
naturally confer the right to sue in tort on the same basis as would be available to married couples. See,
e.g., VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 1201(2) (2007) (declaring that parties to a civil union "may receive the
benefits and protections and be subject to the responsibilities of spouses"); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15,
§ 1204(a) (2007) (civil union confers "all the same benefits, protections and responsibilities under law,
whether they derive from statute, administrative or court rule, policy, common law or any other source
of civil law, as are granted to spouses in a marriage."). On April 7, 2009, the Vermont legislature
overrode the Governor's veto of a marriage equality bill, thereby enacting the legislation. Same-sex
couples are now allowed to marry in Vermont as of September 1, 2009. Gay Marriage Legal in Ver-
mont, 365 GAY, April 7, 2009, at http://www.365gay.com/news/gay-marriage-legal-in-vermont (last
visited October 1, 2009).
160. For an account of the tragic circumstances of Diane Whipple's death, see John Gallagher,
Looking for Meaning in Tragedy, ADVOCATE, Apr. 24, 2001, http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi
m1589/is2001April 24/ai 73308457. Marjorie Knoller and Robert Noel, the couple charged in connec-
tion with Whipple's death, were both convicted of involuntary manslaughter and sentenced to four
years in prison. Knoller Gets Maximum Manslaughter Sentence, DATA LOUNGE, July 16, 2002,
http://www.datalounge.com/datalounge/news/record.html?record=20068. The jury also found Knoller,
who was controlling the dogs at the time of the attack, guilty of second-degree murder. The judge,
however, threw out that finding, citing a lack of evidence to support such a conviction. Knoller and
Noel were then both paroled after receiving time off for good behavior, and both appealed their convic-
tions. Moreover, the California Attorney General's office appealed the dismissal of Knoller's second
murder conviction. Associated Press, Woman Convicted in Dog-Mauling Death is Freed, CNN, Jan. 2,
2004, http://www.cnn.com/2004/LAW/01/02/dog.attack.ap/.
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as written, it seemed that Ms. Whipple's surviving same-sex partner would
not be considered a spouse, and therefore unable to pursue a claim against
the dog owners. Yet the decedent's mother did have a claim, even though
her actual financial loss was insignificant compared to that of the surviving
partner, Sharon Smith. 161 Surprisingly, Smith's case survived a motion to
dismiss despite the statute's apparently clear directive. 162 In reaching its
decision, the trial court pointed out that while Smith and Whipple could
have entered into various legally enforceable agreements to protect their
financial and personal interests, there was no way to avoid the strictures of
the wrongful death law. Thus, the court refused to read the statute to create
an "insurmountable obstacle" to recovery. Such an obstacle was at odds
with the purpose behind the wrongful death statute, which is "to provide
compensation for the loss .... resulting from decedent's
death... Plaintiffs sexuality has no relation to the nature of the wrong
allegedly inflicted upon her and denying recovery would be a windfall for
the tortfeasor."' 163
Thus, even before the wrongful death law was changed, at least one
court took as given the availability of private ordering for same-sex cou-
ples, and then extended that recognition outward to effectively rewrite a
statute that worked a deprivation on the surviving members of such couples
without any corresponding benefit; under the facts of this case, in particu-
lar, it would be hard to devise a compelling policy argument for letting the
defendants profit from their reckless (or worse) misconduct. Another point
worth making is that the court was willing to work around not only the
statute but the then-recent California voter initiative that had defined mar-
riage as "one man, one woman." Indeed, the court simply ignored the ini-
tiative, as did the California legislature in enacting the first in what turned
out to be a series of increasingly expansive domestic partnership laws. Ar-
161. At least a strict reading of the statute would not have permitted recovery. But the trial court
allowed the case to proceed even under the former law. Smith v. Knoller, No. 319532, slip op. (Cal.
Super. Ct. Aug. 9, 2001). The court reasoned that the statute, if read to exclude plaintiff, would create
an insurmountable burden to her recovery (because there was no way to contract around the prohibition
against recovery), and held that the statute had to be interpreted to allow surviving members of same-
sex couples to recover (upon a sufficient factual showing) to save it from unconstitutionality as a viola-
tion of equal protection. Id. at 3-4.
162. Id.
163. Id. In recognizing that wrongful death law should not penalize a party who is unable to protect
him or herself, the court developed a line of argument that traces back to Levy v. Louisiana, in which
the Supreme Court declared unconstitutional laws that discriminated against out-of-wedlock children in
actions to recover for a relative's death. 391 U.S. 68, 71 (1968). In so holding, the Court articulated
rationales that closely parallel those invoked by the Smith court, including the "intimate, familial rela-
tionship," the wrong suffered, the unfairness of denying rights for a status beyond the individual's
control, and the prospect of a windfall to the tortfeasor. Id. In sum, the Court found that the classifica-
tion had "no relation to the nature of the wrong" suffered. Id. at 72.
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guably, these moves again illustrate that it is easier to confer the benefits of
marriage than it is the marriage label itself.
In a more recent case, a New York state trial judge followed a similar
approach. In Langan v. St. Vincent's Hospital,164 a trial judge in New York
State recognized a civil union entered into by two New York residents in
Vermont for the limited purpose of allowing the survivor's wrongful death
claim to proceed.165 The relevant facts were these: Neal Spicehandler died,
allegedly as the result of medical malpractice, and his surviving partner,
John Langan, brought suit against St. Vincent's Hospital for wrongful
death. 166 The New York wrongful death statute is typical in restricting
recovery to named classes of beneficiaries, including spouses but not un-
married partners. 167 The court, however, permitted Langan's case to pro-
ceed despite this apparent infirmity.
The court used a great number of tools in constructing its decision,
beginning by charting the lives of the couple in a way reminiscent of the
approach of courts recognizing marriage equality. Justice Dunne empha-
sized that Langan and Spicehandler had been together for fifteen years, had
jointly bought a house, were completely financially and legally intertwined
through wills and life insurance policies, and had traveled to Vermont and
entered into a civil union, which evinced their desire to confirm their status
as a couple to the extent legally possible. 168 The court also pointed to the
willingness of New York courts to read certain laws expansively to give
legal standing to the surviving member of same-sex couples in other areas,
including accession to rent-controlled apartments, 169 and the willingness of
the New York legislature (which is fairly progressive on same-sex issues)
to grant rights in such diverse areas as adoption, 170 discrimination, 17 1 and
eligibility for certain state-conferred death benefits. 172 The court also
stressed the importance of recognizing a sister state's laws, including Ver-
mont's civil union law, and in harmony with the California trial court,
found that allowing the claim would be consonant with the purpose of the
164. 765 N.Y.S.2d 411 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2003), rev'd in part, 802 N.Y.S.2d 476 (N.Y. App. Div.
2005).
165. Id. at 422.
166. Id. at 412.
167. N.Y. EST. POWERS & TRUSTS LAW § 5-4.4(a) (McKinney 2004).
168. Langan, 765 N.Y.S.2d at 412-13.
169. Id. at 415 (citing Braschi v. Stahl Assocs., 543 N.E.2d 49 (N.Y. 1989)).
170. Id. at 416 (citing In re Jacob, 660 N.E.2d 397 (N.Y. 1995)).
171. N.Y. EXEC. LAW § 291(1)-(2) (McKinney 2004); Langan, 765 N.Y.S.2d at 416 (citing N.Y.
Civ. RIGHTS LAW § 40-c(2) (McKinney 2004)).
172. Langan, 765 N.Y.S.2d at 416 (citing New York City, N.Y., Local Law No. 24 Int. 114-A
(2002)).
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wrongful death laws. Finally, the court also stated that its expansion con-
struction of the statute was in part to avoid the equal protection concern
that denial of the claim would raise.
These decisions, though, are outliers. Langan was overturned on ap-
peal, with the appellate court taking the simple and direct course of reading
the statute literally; since only marriage (not even civil unions) permits the
surviving member to recover, Mr. Langan had no claim. 173 Smith disap-
pears from the record after the trial court's decision, but a line of California
appellate cases suggests that this decision, too, was fragile.
Even in Massachusetts, a loss of consortium claim-not even a
wrongful death claim (which would have been barred by statute)-brought
by the surviving member of a same-sex couple based on events occurring
before Goodridge was denied. 174 The case is a striking example of the con-
tinued toll of discriminatory laws on same-sex couples, inasmuch as it was
the court that pioneered marriage equality that also denied the claim, again
pinning its holding on the still strong desire to fix a bright line between
marriage and "mere cohabitation."' 175 This conclusion was reached despite
the couple's long life together and, perhaps more to the point, their decision
to seek a marriage license on the very first day the law changed to accom-
modate them. 176
Of course, the difficulty in these cases is eliminated by marriage
equality and also by civil unions and the "full plate" domestic partnership
approach found in Oregon. 177 But legislation is not even necessary for
courts to give recognition to private agreements, and increasingly these are
regarded as enforceable-even in states with the most restrictive anti-
equality laws. For example, consider Stroud v. Stroud,178 in which a Vir-
ginia appellate court construed a divorcing couple's property settlement
agreement as terminated by the former wife's cohabitation with a same-sex
partner. The document had provided that the husband's support obligation
would terminate if the wife were to cohabitate with anyone in a "situation
analogous to marriage." The trial court had held that, under Virginia law, a
same-sex relationship could amount to neither marriage nor a situation
analogous thereto. There was some warrant for doing so, given Virginia's
extremely broad prohibition against not only same-sex marriages, but also
173. 802 N.Y.S.2d 476, 478-80 (N.Y. App. Div. 2005).
174. Charron v. Amaral, 889 N.E.2d 946, 948 (Mass. 2008).
175. Id. at 948-49.
176. Id. at 948.
177. See supra note 129 (discussing California's summary of civil union and domestic partnership
laws).
178. 641 S.E.2d 142, 145 (Va. Ct. App. 2007).
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the "civil union, partnership contract or other arrangement between persons
of the same sex purporting to bestow the privileges or obligations of mar-
riage."'179 But the appellate court looked to the reality of the relationship
and the likely intentions of the parties in creating the agreement (including
parol evidence) in concluding that the obligation should be terminated.180
Tellingly, the court stated that its decision did not grant any legal status
(which would presumably have been impermissible under Virginia law) to
the cohabitation relationship, but was based "upon the factual relationship
of [the same-sex couple]."' 181 Well, yes and no: Surely the court was using
the relationship to affect another legal obligation, and thereby giving it at
least derivative legal effect. One would hardly expect a different result,
given the basic unfairness to the obligor spouse of the contrary result.
Indeed, counseling and drafting of private agreements between same-
sex couples has been a profitable business for attorneys, given the law's
failure to accord such couples the benefit of default rules that govern the
marital relationship. One recent article, written by an attorney who rou-
tinely creates such agreements, demonstrates that they have become com-
monplace, cover a wide variety of property, parenting, and tax issues, and
are usually enforceable if sufficiently clear. 182 Whether such agreements
will be universally enforceable may be in some doubt, however, given the
ever-extending reach of some of the anti-marriage equality initiatives. In a
distressing development, the Michigan Supreme Court recently ruled that
that state's broadly worded anti-equality marriage amendment prohibits
public employers from granting health-insurance benefits to their employ-
ees' same-sex domestic partners. 183 The court also declined to rule out the
possibility that the law would also prohibit private employers from provid-
179. VA. CODE ANN. § 20-45.3 (West 2008). A Utah case also regarded a same-sex relationship as
one of cohabitation, and thereby terminated support payments under a state statute (as opposed to the
agreement in Stroud) that regarded cohabitation as a basis for such termination. Garcia v. Garcia, 60
P.3d 1174 (Utah Ct. App. 2002). Regarding the essence of cohabitation as sexual contact, the court
rejected the lower court's conclusion that same-sex couples could not cohabitate, stating:
[T]he district court only points out that 'same sex' couples are not afforded the same legal
rights as... married couples. We fail to see how the differing legal rights of married and
same-sex couples necessitates the statutory interpretation that same-sex couples may not have
sexual conduct [amounting to cohabitation under the case law].
Id. at 1175 n. 1, 1175.
180. Stroud, 641 S.E.2d at 145-47.
181. Id. at 151.
182. See Wendy S. Goffe, Preparing Effective Cohabitation Agreements for Unmarried Couples,
34 EST. PLAN. 7 (2007). In skeptical jurisdictions, especially Illinois, the agreement must always be in
writing (absent a difficult constructive trust argument). Id. at 9. But the point is that the enforceability
of support and other such agreements is largely uncontroversial today.
183. Nat'l. Pride at Work v. Governor of Mich., 748 N.W.2d 524, 543 (Mich. 2008).
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ing such benefits, 184 but one would be justified in worrying about that re-
sult, as well as about whether private property arrangements will continue
to be "recognized," if they are considered to create a union "similar" to
marriage (whatever that means). The Michigan case is an anomaly, how-
ever, and even there one would be surprised were the court not to recognize
private agreements under standard contract principles.
CONCLUSION
On November 4, 2008, anti-gay forces succeeded in passing four sepa-
rate, state-wide initiatives making life more difficult for gay families. Ari-
zona amended its constitution to prohibit same-sex marriages. 185 Florida
voters ratified an amendment to that state's constitution that prohibits
same-sex marriages, and goes further, also prospectively disqualifying any
"substantial equivalent," a term perniciously vague. 186 As noted earlier,
California voters narrowly approved Proposition 8, which purports to strip
gay couples of the right to marry they already possess. 187 Worst of all, per-
haps, is the Arkansas voters' passage of a law that, in an effort explicitly
aimed against gay couples, 188 prohibits any unmarried cohabitants from
adopting or fostering children. 189 This, in a state that, like many others, has
a shortage of loving homes where needy children might be placed.190
In light of these retrograde developments, one might be tempted to see
the movement for equality as having crested, with the anti-equality forces
now in full cry. But that would be too pessimistic a conclusion to draw. On
November 12, the first same-sex marriages took place in Connecticut.' 91
Iowa's first same-sex marriage followed shortly thereafter, on April 27,
2009.192 Vermont moved from civil unions to full marriage equality, with
184. Id. at 529-30 n.1.
185. See Jesse McKinley & Laurie Goodstein, Bans in 3 States on Gay Marriage, N.Y. TIMES,
Nov. 5, 2008, at Al.
186. Id.
187. Id. See also supra note 9 and accompanying text.
188. See Andrew DeMillo, Arkansas Judges Oppose Proposed Foster, Adoption Ban,
BAXTERBULLETIN, http://www.baxterbulletin.com/apps/pbcs.dll/article?AID=/20081006/IUPDATES01/
81006008/1002/NEWSO1 (last visited Nov. 14, 2008).
189. See McKinley & Goodstein, supra note 177, at Al.
190. All Things Considered: Arkansas Voters to Decide Unmarried Adoption, (National Public
Radio Broadcast Oct. 26, 2008) available at http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?story
d=96154280.
191. Lisa W. Foderado, A New Day for Marriage in Connecticut, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 13, 2008, at
A3 1.
192. Amy Lorentzen, Same-Sex Couples Begin Tying the Knot in Iowa, SFGATE, Apr. 27, 2009,




licenses issued on September 1.193 New Jersey and possibly New York are
expected to follow within the next two years. 194 President Barack Obama
pledges to lead the repeal the Defense of Marriage Act, 195 and the newly
ascendant Democratic majority in both houses of Congress may be set to
enact the long-dormant Employment Non-Discrimination Act, that would
protect gays, lesbians, and (I hope) the transgendered on the job, 196 thereby
federalizing the current patchwork of laws that leaves many employees
unprotected. As this article was going to press, the U.S. House of Repre-
sentatives passed a hate crimes bill. 197
There's more to cheer. First-time voters in California rejected Proposi-
tion 8, and, in general, the opposition to marriage equality is closely corre-
lated with voter age: the younger the voter, the likelier he or she is to
support full equality. 198 Indeed, younger citizens, linked up by the vast and
creative web community, have led demonstrations against Proposition 8
since its passage. 199 These citizens have come of age in an era where visi-
ble gay people and gay relationships are almost universal, both in media
depictions and among their own circle of family and friends. Their paths
have been forged, and their confidence fueled, by the inspiring work and
courage of pioneers for equality and justice like Phyllis Lyon and the late
Del Martin.
193. See supra note 159.
194. New Legislatures Expected to Take Up Gay Marriage Bills in 5 States, 365GAY, Nov. 5, 2008,
http://www.365gay.com/news/new-legislatures-expected-to-take-up-gay-marriage-bills-in-5 -states.
195. Would Obama Position Spread Same-Sex Marriage?, ABC NEWS, Aug. 7, 2007,
http://blogs.abcnews.com/politicalradar/2007/08/would-obama-pos.html.
196. For an interesting "insiders' view" of then-candidate Obama's views on marriage equality and
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